System and Spectrality: Investigating David Bordwell's Manual(s) of Classical Narrative Cinema by Norford, Daniel
  SYSTEM AND SPECTRALITY: INVESTIGATING 
DAVID BORDWELL’S MANUAL(S) OF CLASSICAL 
NARRATIVE CINEMA 
 
 
   By 
   DANIEL NORFORD 
    Bachelor of Arts in History  
   University of Vermont 
   Burlington, VT 
   2005 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   MASTER OF ARTS 
   May, 2010  
ii 
 
   SYSTEM AND SPECTRALITY: INVESTIGATING 
DAVID BORDWELL’S MANUAL(S) OF CLASSICAL 
NARRATIVE CINEMA 
 
 
   Thesis  Approved: 
 
 Dr. Brian Price 
 Thesis Adviser 
   Dr. Meghan Sutherland 
 
   Dr. Hugh Manon 
 
  Dr. A. Gordon Emslie 
   Dean of the Graduate College 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I would like to sincerely thank the following people: Drs. Brian Price and Meghan Sutherland, for 
their close readings of multiple drafts, and for their careful and thoughtful guidance throughout 
the writing process; Dr. Hugh Manon, for his astute comments on past seminar papers ( without 
which the present work would have suffered greatly) and for his presence on my committee; Dr. 
Martin Wallen, whose absorbing lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida fueled the 
creative process and provided surprising avenues of inspiration; Scott Krych, who has on 
numerous occasions provided answers to burning questions, and whose presentations in 
multiple World Picture Conferences have both influenced and edified; Lori Raborg, whose 
unflagging patience and comprehensive knowledge of policy and procedure have proven 
invaluable too many times to count; Dr. Rebecca Damron, for giving me the opportunity to 
return to the writing center during an intensely difficult period; Jenna Polk, Jeni Maple, Joseph 
Wagner,  and Jon Taylor, for their priceless friendship; Dr. Carol Moder, for her understanding 
and sympathy; Kristina Barnard, for her love and support in all things; my parents, Don Norford 
and Ann Donahue, who have always provided support, both emotional and financial; and to my 
brother, Jesse Norford, whose insightful mind has suggested avenues of surprising potency for 
years.
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION:”SPIRIT AND “THE CUT” ........................................................1 
 
 
II.  SYSTEM AND SPECTRALITY 
  
 The System and its Devices .....................................................................................8 
 On the (Arch) Manual ............................................................................................17 
 On the Khora ..........................................................................................................35 
 The “Story” Within Stories ....................................................................................44 
 The Ghosts(s) of Device and Denotation ...............................................................55 
 Conclusion:”Truth Values”; or, “the Man Behind the Desk” ................................59
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: “SPIRIT” AND “THE CUT”  
 The inspiration for this project stems in part from two different sources: the first 
was a paper that I wrote during the fall semester of 2007 for Dr. Brian Price’s seminar on 
Avant-garde cinema. Taking Antonin Artaud as its focal point, the paper sought to come 
to terms with what I was then calling “the surgery of spectatorship,” but which I now 
more precisely think of as the spectrality of film-viewing. As I began to research this 
topic, I discovered that spectrality has a long and troubled history—not only in film 
theory, but also within wider debates within continental philosophy and its various post-
structuralisms. At its core (in the context of my own readership) lies the thinking of 
Jacques Derrida, particularly his work on the question of “spirit” in Heidegger’s 
rectorship address.1 Although far too complex for me to do it justice within the span of a 
mere introduction, Derrida’s intervention has been foundational for my work on two 
levels: Firstly, that “spirit,” as a concept and as a thing, is always constitutively 
spectral—it is, in other words, a figure of the double. It is this status that the quotation 
marks surrounding it attempt to account for—a gesture that Derrida eventually finds both 
inadequate and seductive. In Heidegger’s thought, the quotation marks serve, in part, to 
intervene in order to ensure the reader that “spirit” is something that he wishes to revise, 
to come to grips with in order to move beyond its connotative adherence to a 
philosophical tradition.
                                                          
1
 In Derrida, Jacques. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
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He purports, perhaps, to not speak of it in its association with a Hegelian logic of onto-
theology; that is, a conception of “spirit” that defines it as a unifying and transcendent 
principle of signifying and historical meaning, concentrated within the cyclical reasoning 
of the dialectic. What Heidegger wishes to “avoid,”2 in this case, might be that eventual 
moment of the dialectic that sees spirit ascend and become sovereign, retroactively 
positing the stubborn dialectical ruptures as inevitable moves towards a higher resolution 
in religious spirit. This move would seem to be strictly at odds with Heidegger’s 
ontological conception of being as a function of spacing—as itself defined as “nearness” 
to itself.3 In seeking to refine and depart from Hegel’s spectrality, then, Heidegger 
conceives of a ghost that is both new and old—both, because the exact status of “spirit” 
and its quotational prison will have always been up for decision, not least of all because 
of its unbounded appearance within the announcement of Heidegger’s political downfall. 
“Spirit,” then, is a figure of the double in Heidegger’s writing because of what Derrida 
introduces as the moment of “avoiding” that suggests both a phobia and a secret 
predilection for its connotative force(s). Answering one phantom with another, Heidegger 
splits him-self into two competing acts of thinking, which function in a way very similar 
to, but not synonymous with, the dialectic. Derrida stages the question of such a conflict : 
“What does “avoid” mean…I’m thinking in particular of all those modalities of 
“avoiding” which come down to saying without saying, writing without writing, using 
words without using them: in quotation marks, for example….”4 
                                                          
2
 Ibid, 1-7.  
3
 This formulation is famously articulated in: Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, 
ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 213-267.   
4
 Derrida, Of Spirit, 2. 
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 This idea of “spirit” and its silence (through not being spoken about in a particular 
sense) have remained with me beyond the bounds of that original paper because of its 
resonance across filmic discourses as diverse as historicist archival research, genre 
studies, feminist theories of spectatorship, certain psychoanalytic perspectives, and 
cognitive psychological approaches to film form and film viewing. For instance, “spirit” 
is most pervasively at work (although seldom explicitly named) when we talk about the 
mythological underpinnings of a genre that is burdened with representing a seminal 
moment of the national imaginary. I am thinking particularly of the Hollywood western, 
especially its place in the writings of Robert Warshow:  
Above all, the movies in which the Westerner plays out his role preserve for us 
the pleasures of a complete and self-contained drama—and one which still 
effortlessly crosses the boundaries which divide our culture—in a time when 
other, more consciously serious art forms are increasingly complex, uncertain, 
and ill-defined.5 
I choose this quote not to single Warshow out (in fact, I have found this essay endlessly 
fascinating and surprising), but because I see within it a conflictedness that typifies the 
process of writing about something that cannot be manifested: the unspoken, 
unrepresentable “spirit” (of an age, a decade, a people, etc.) that peeks out from behind 
the corners of the text in question; in this case, the figure of the classical Hollywood 
Western. What is particularly note-worthy about Warshow’s conclusion is its attempt to 
take seriously the paradox that the Western performs: on the one hand, ‘crossing the 
boundaries of culture’ and providing a certain unity of experience; on the other hand, a 
                                                          
5
 Robert Warshow, “Movie Chronicle: The Westerner,” in Film Theory and Criticism (5
th
 Ed.) eds. Leo 
Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 667.  
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conception of the modern world that now sees the Western as somewhat outdated, even 
“archaic,” to quote Warshow.6 What resonates from within this essay (and particularly 
this quote), then, is the enticing relationship of a figure (the Western) to its ground 
(culture). The fact that the latter goes so unqualified—indeed, is virtually taken for 
granted—indicates, not conceptual or intellectual carelessness, but a certain (un)canny 
relationship to the knowledge that we may or may not have about the time and place that 
we live in, and the meaning that we may accordingly make therein. What Warshow’s 
piece expresses—what it attempts both to take for granted and to take very seriously—is 
a relationship to the art object that stresses the spacing it represents: the distance it has 
not only from our own work-a-day experience of modernity, but also from that 
unqualified double of “culture” that makes its way into the tail-end of a discourse, 
virtually announcing itself as an old friend. It is this constitutive tendency that continues 
to fascinate me, not only about film theory in particular, but thinking in general. Where, 
when, and in what way will “we” have been able to conceive of our relationship to 
ourselves. That is the question the Western really asks, according to Warshow, and it is 
also the question that haunts this essay. 
 The other, later impetus for this piece is the thinking of my advisor and mentor, 
Dr. Brian Price. In a talk entitled “The Sacred and the Violent” (a chapter from a 
forthcoming project entitled Fables of Causality: Cinema After Metaphysics), Price 
teased out the political and philosophical import of traditional accounts of film theory and 
history, and concluded that they often function logocentrically—that is, as forms of 
apophatic reasoning: in seemingly innocent discussions of cinematic development, a 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
5 
 
regressive conception of history is at work—one that is determined to see an absolute and 
unified narrative that can only be “produced” negatively—that is, through its apparent 
metonymic relationship to the operations of form and style that the specific film text 
engages in. What film is coerced into expressing, then, is an indexical relationship to a 
certain conception of “spirit.” Significantly, Price “begins” with the cut—that most basic 
unit of film editing: 
I am particularly interested in the ways in which we use this word, the cut. I am 
interested in what the word hides in or between images; how it announces what it 
hides; and how the sacrificial connotations of the word and the practice have thus 
far eluded our understanding. What I am interested in is the paradox of the cut, 
this practice that binds two images, and in doing so, cannot be seen.7 
It is this initial observation that forms the basis of Price’s contention that our attitude to 
film form is apophatic: that it works, like Saussure’s signifier, to negatively define 
something else in relation to itself, and that this something else is often conceived of 
religiously, as providing a synthesis or “essence” of experience that binds the abject 
particularities of a discourse together. Price speaks of the “sacrifice” of the cut, how it 
“gives itself to the ghost” in order to ensure a higher signification. He also speaks of 
faith—that which we must have in order to believe that the cut works in the way that it 
does, and that it expresses what it must.  
 “Spirit” and the cut. These two “concepts” (if such a word is even appropriate) 
have formed what could be considered the basis for the present work. It is no accident, 
then, that this paper engages so insistently with the work of David Bordwell. I have been 
                                                          
7
 Price, Brian. “The Sacred and the Violent.” Chapter from a forthcoming manuscript, 3. 
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driven towards Bordwell’s work for a number of reasons, but by way of a beginning let 
me simply say that Bordwell is always thinking about continuity, both aesthetically and 
institutionally; both about what it looks like and about its conditions of possibility. In 
doing so, he is also a thinker of the cut, but in a way that Price would no doubt call 
severely apophatic. It is my opinion (I hesitate to call it a “belief!”) that Bordwell’s 
corpus, because it is so stringently apophatic, is an instructive example of the spacing that 
must exist between a thinker and his work: how one must eventually depart from what 
one has written, essentially letting the text speak through itself in the imminent break of a 
reading. Bordwell’s work dramatizes this, first of all, because of its repetitive nature; 
always, as I have said, about continuity on one register or another. In book after book, 
Bordwell seems to agonize over the inevitable moment when he will have to leave films 
to themselves again, never entirely accounted for within his feverish archival studies. But 
Bordwell’s work is also of unique interest today because of what it wishes to ensure—a 
systematic conception of self and other that takes both against the background of a certain 
familiar ground: one that is never directly representable, but which is called forth in the 
interstices of writing and reading film. It is Bordwell’s attempt, not just to “prove” the 
existence of this ground, but to take it for granted, that I will be investigating here. This 
ground is almost invariably referred to by Bordwell as “classical narrative,” but he often 
speaks synonymously of Hollywood; of its system(s), its style, and its influence. 
Continuity, then, refers not only to the continuity of a specific film narrative, but 
continuity writ large—across a spectrum of texts that Bordwell encloses within a 
haunting schematic of “classical” force. This notion of the “classical,” moreoever, is also 
marshaled by Bordwell in the service of analyzing the scholarly institution in which he 
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works—a “system” that bears many remarkable similarities to the aesthetic paradigm that 
Bordwell will never, apparently, stop describing. The structures and strategies in place 
that both constrain and permit his labor (for, indeed, labor is what I take it to be) are an 
endless source of both fear and fascination for him, not the least because they serve as the 
locus of both his scholarship and the work of certain others that he would like to dismiss: 
psychoanalytic thinkers, semioticians, Marxists, cultural critics, and all of the other 
purveyors of his so-called “Grand Theory.” “Continuity,” “classical narrative,” 
Hollywood, the institution of film studies and its prescriptive conditions for having and 
“making meaning: it is the spectral operation of these “systems” that eventually makes 
Bordwell’s writing so instructive, not the least because it works to problematize the very 
legitimacy of his project. But, more of that later.    
My project (you have probably realized) is a deconstructive one, but I hope that 
will not deter the reader from thinking that this work is also haunted by a certain 
practicality—the imminent possibility that it might be picked up and used, driven into 
service by an-other. I feel very close to Bordwell in this regard, and I wish to say it in the 
introduction, at the risk that I might forget myself during the course of a writing: I am 
jealous of Bordwell. I believe that he has demonstrated something fundamental about 
“making meaning.” In doing so, however, what place will there have been for the 
system(s) that he so earnestly wishes to exist? Indeed, what place will there have been for 
any of us?    
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CHAPTER II 
SYSTEM AND SPECTRALITY 
 
THE SYSTEM AND ITS DEVICES 
 
 Judging from the title, one might expect David Bordwell’s The Way Hollywood 
Tells It (2006) to represent a typically uncomplicated explication of his much-cherished 
“Hollywood Style.” This is, in fact, the stated point of the text. However, perhaps more 
urgently a matter of concern for Bordwell (and for us) is the nature and progression of 
what he terms “intensified continuity”: that tendency of new Hollywood cinema (post-
1960, according to Bordwell) to accelerate the so-called “devices” of seamless narrative 
(dynamic cuts, multiple lenses, mobile cameras, and frequent close-ups) in the name of 
energizing the viewing experience. The progression of this trend is (for Bordwell) a 
provocative source of both interest and anxiety: on the one hand, the panorama of post-
1960s American film offers him an enticing opportunity to re-describe and consolidate 
his conception of the Hollywood “system”; a task at once historical, aesthetic and—
despite Bordwell’s implicit claims to the contrary—deeply political.8 On the other hand, 
the very description of that system results in a vision of Hollywood that, while as 
seamless and historically static as ever, has nevertheless gone out of control; it has, in 
                                                          
8
Although writings on Bordwell are numerous, critiques that actually tease out the political import of his 
scholarly project are relatively few in number. One of the most high profile attempts is made by Slavoj 
Zizek in: Slavoj Zizek, The Fright of Real Tears (London: British Film Institute, 1999). Zizek offers an initial 
series of provocative (and, I think, correct) attacks on Bordwell’s school of Neo-formalism before 
predictably degenerating into a scattered rehearsal of dialectical torsions and anti-historicist revolt.  For a 
much more cogent and sustained engagement with the politics of Bordwell, see: James S. Hurley, “David 
Bordwell’s Iron Cage of Style”, Film-Philosophy . 2, no. 26 (1998).. For a terrific critique of Zizek’s critique, 
see: John Orr, “Right Direction, Wrong Turning: On Zizek’s _The Fright of Real Tears_”, Film-Philosophy 7, 
no. 30 (2003).  
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short, become “too” Hollywood for Bordwell’s liking. This apparent paradox, then, urges 
him to engage in a circumspective but continuous polemic; in describing the prevalent 
“tools” of intensified continuity, he cannot help but describe how easily they can be 
abused. This polemic, significantly, carries the benevolent concern of a diagnosis. Take, 
for instance, this deflated evaluation (one of many) of a scene layout from Peter 
Jackson’s The Two Towers (2002):  
In our sequence, the cuts and camera moves display no overarching pattern…The 
result of cutting to every speaker for each line and fleeting reaction is a haphazard 
shot-snatching. Every shot is interrupted by another, as if to display a little of each 
angle of coverage; but no image can develop much power. Oddly, a strategy 
designed to amp up energy serves to dissipate it.9 
This example, then, serves as one of the innumerable symptoms of a “new” system that 
respects and continues the logic of Bordwell’s Hollywood, but whose most prevalent 
devices frequently serve to constrain the choices and range of expression of directors. 
Here, the overwhelming interruption of each shot by the cut results in a strange double 
gesture: on the one hand, it speeds up the action; on the other hand, it discharges the 
potential “energy” of the sequence. This paradox, moreover, manifests itself in the 
strange conflict between the continuity of the macrocosmic Hollywood system itself, and 
the “interruption” that the individual device (here, the cut from shot to shot) achieves in 
the proper functioning of that system. Both agent for and contamination of Hollywood, 
the device plays a role in a narrative that Bordwell does not, perhaps, realize he is telling. 
It is the apparent paradoxes of that narrative that I will attempt to address in this chapter. 
                                                          
9
 David Bordwell, The Way Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style in Modern Movies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 165. 
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In particular, I am interested in the doubled nature of the “Hollywood system” that 
Bordwell’s book articulates. Specifically, I believe the figure of the double implicates 
Bordwell’s argument in an unwitting experiment in deconstruction. This deconstruction, 
moreover, attends not only to Bordwell’s individual text, but also to his corpus as a 
whole, and by extension to the very idea of writing (a) cinematic ontology(s) of film 
form. More explicitly, I believe that Bordwell’s conception of classical cinema(s) results 
in a spectral logic that renders each movement doubled—each system at once constituted 
and haunted, that is, by its opposite.  
 To begin with, we must attend to the historical break that Bordwell posits in 
Hollywood history: The first half of the twentieth century, typified by the dominance of 
high classical narrative practices; and the second half, in which intensified continuity 
attains dominance. The first period, as famously described by Bordwell, Janet Staiger and 
Kristin Thompson in The Classical Hollywood Cinema, is conceptualized as a three-
tiered system, wherein the primary system of narrative logic dominates the particular 
devices of spatial and temporal logic (three-point lighting, parallel editing, jump-cuts, 
etc.). A cohesive system unto itself, Hollywood style is also, then, an interrelationship 
between systems and devices of systems: 
In the Hollywood style, the systems do not play equal roles: space and time are 
almost invariably made vehicles for narrative causality. Moreover, specific 
principles govern that process. At this level, even irregularities in the various 
systems can be seen as purposeful. For instance, if we do find a passage of 
discontinuous cutting, we can ask whether it is still serving a narrative function 
(e.g., to convey a sudden, shocking event). In such a case, the relation among 
11 
 
systems would remain consistent even if the individual device or system varied 
from normal usage.10 
 Significantly, then, Bordwell limits the evolution of the Hollywood system with respect 
to which devices become popular for specific functions.  In other words, the defining 
system of narrative and the secondary systems of spatial and temporal logic remain fixed 
through the whole of Hollywood history. Therefore, the era of intensified continuity 
simply represents a shifting of philosophy with respect to which devices shall fulfill 
which narrative duties. Underlying the historical change of devices, then, is a hallowed 
ground that remains always the same; in each and every case, the system of narrative 
logic will have overseen the operations of spatial and temporal construction through a 
placement that is both before (in the sense of a grounding and constitutive principle) and 
through (because it is manifested in the relationship of spatial and temporal devices) its 
manifesting devices. 
 However, we may ask: Why this concern over the excessive cutting of intensified-
continuity? If the devices remain consistent in their usage (and Bordwell does not suggest 
that the sequence he describes is excessive in any “radical” way), then how can they still 
generate a dissipation of the effect that they were intended to have in the first place? 
How, in other words, can the frequency of the cut still account for a certain level of 
discomfort, however “comprehensible” it still remains? The answer, I believe, is simply 
that the device (in this case, a simple cut) begins to signify something other than what it 
should: it becomes, then, a spectral figure. What this means, is that while still 
(apparently) signifying “system,” the device begins to also signify its antithesis: the 
                                                          
10
 David Bordwell; Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and 
Mode of Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 6. 
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destruction or—more worrisome—even the non-existence of system. When Bordwell 
expresses anxiety over the ways in which a device works, then, what he is really fretting 
over is no small matter of slight deviation from a norm, but in fact the calling into 
question of any kind of cohesive, schematic logic.  
 The double complicates, then, Bordwell’s narrative. On the one hand, we have a 
Hollywood system that never changes; on the other hand, there is apparently a decisive 
break between “old” (classical) and “new” (hyper-classical) Hollywood; a break that also 
signals a new status for its devices. This ambivalent break, moreover, is very much a 
matter of the  relationship of figure and ground. In this context, the Hollywood device is 
the manifest figure that acts as the singular sign of the system, whereas seamless 
narrative is the ground and horizon defining the limits of what a given figure can and 
cannot do. However, even as narrative logic apparently dictates the teleology of its 
elements, it is the devices themselves that not only articulate that system, but act as its 
explicit metonymic signifiers. In other words, there is no Hollywood system without its 
devices. This figuration of the system, then, calls forth what for us will be the primary 
importance of the double: even as the figure in question is dictated by its ground, the 
former is always and simultaneously the calling into question of “system” as such. This 
operation, then, results in a perspective in which the universal (system) and the particular 
(device) are indistinguishable from one another. The import of this for Bordwell’s 
argument is clear: he wishes to assign cinematic devices a secondary status because they 
follow from the dictates of the Hollywood system. However, there will have been no 
proof of system without devices, and accordingly there will have been no deciding on the 
13 
 
originary status of either.11 What Bordwell does, however, should not hastily be seen as a 
mere conceptual weakness. Indeed, it is this paradoxical quality that makes his schema as 
seductive and haunting as it is. The extent to which this haunting quality of system can be 
accounted for, moreover, leads in the direction of what Bordwell can least afford to (not) 
talk about: the spectral possibility of the double as an automatic effect of inscription in 
any form, whether it be a filmic device, a speech act, or the loaded process of historical 
and aesthetic decision. The Hollywood system itself will have been a matter not of unity 
or balance, but of spacing. Bordwell himself begins with this assumption, although its 
import for his project is vastly (and necessarily) underplayed: “The system cannot 
determine every minute detail of the work, but it isolates preferred practices and sets 
limits upon invention…[I]t is unlikely that any Hollywood film will perfectly embody all 
norms..No Hollywood film is the classical system; each is an ‘unstable equilibrium’ of 
classical norms.”12 The “classical Hollywood style” proper does not, in fact, exist. It 
functions as an idealized placeholder that frames every cinematic output. It is, in other 
words, a specter, both of form and meaning. How, then, can it be the objective historical 
phenomenon that Bordwell wishes it to be? The answer lies, I believe, in a foray into 
deconstructive analyses of rhetorical devices and their role in language and meaning. It is 
                                                          
11
 The confusion of figure and ground is central to Bordwell’s anxiety, I argue, because it problematizes 
the security of the referent on which his argument hinges. An enlightening analysis of this essentialist 
tendency in cognitivist schools is undertaken (from a Wittgensteinian perspective) in: Bryan Vescio, 
“Reading in the Dark: Cognitivism, Film Theory, and Radical Interpretation,” Style 35, no. 4, 2001. Similar 
in some respects to my argument, Vescio argues that Wittgenstein’s notion of “radical interpretation” 
makes the “language games” (which Bordwell and others wish to restrict to discrete institutional realms) 
that we play pervasive across the spectrum of human truth-making, thus deeply qualifying the notion of a 
fixed a priori referent.  
12
 Bordwell et al, Classical Hollywood Cinema, 5. 
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here that an intervention can be made in the continuity that Bordwell so insistently 
constructs.  
 The germ for this intervention stems in no small part from Paul de Man’s 
conception of allegory within the context of philosophical and literary texts. For de Man, 
a text “allegorizes” itself in so far as it must always rely on the rhetorical tropes (one 
might say the devices) that it wishes to call into question. In Allegories of Reading, one of 
his major examples is a fragment from Nietzsche’s Will to Power, a compilation of notes 
that was published posthumously. The fragment affords de Man the opportunity to make 
one of the seminal claims of his text: that rhetoric and the tropes that comprise it 
(metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, etc.) are not simply developed out of a fixed set of 
rules on oratory or persuasive “eloquence.” De Man explains: 
The dependence of eloquence on figure is only a further consequence of a more 
fundamental observation: tropes are not understood aesthetically, as ornament, 
nor are they understood semantically as a figurative meaning that derives from 
literal, proper denomination. Rather, the reverse is the case. The trope is not a 
derived, marginal, or aberrant form of language but the linguistic paradigm par 
excellence. The figurative structure is not one linguistic mode among others but it 
characterizes language as such.13   
For de Man, Nietzsche’s re-formulation of the status of figural language has cataclysmic 
implications for philosophical texts. If tropes are not restricted to specific discursive 
modes (oratory, persuasion, polemic, etc.) but function ontologically as the very “stuff” 
of language, then there is no such thing as a text that is not figural; and therefore, there is 
                                                          
13
 Paul De Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 105. 
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no such thing as a work of philosophy that is not also a work of literature. De Man’s 
argument represents a sustained critique of the traditional distinction drawn between 
philosophical texts (which attempt to transcend their finite circumstances and reach some 
form of absolute knowledge or “truth”) and literary texts (which are degraded as a result 
of their inauthentic representation of the events of history, culture, and society). In de 
Man’s view, the ontological primacy of figural language effectively suspends this 
distinction, since there is no meta-language with which a text claiming to be 
philosophical could speak. In other words, there is no existing outside of language or 
history, and accordingly there is no polemic on language that can prevent itself from 
being contaminated by rhetoric. 
In making figural language a “paradigm” of expression, Nietzsche demonstrates 
not only that there is no “pure” language, but also that the binary oppositions so well-
known in logocentric discourses are equally untenable. In another fragment from Will to 
Power, de Man analyzes an example that will be particularly relevant to the present 
argument: Nietzsche’s assertion that, chronologically, we experience a sensory effect 
(pain, pleasure) before the cause of the sensation itself. This is because we cannot be 
conscious of the way in which external impressions effect us; in fact, the retroactivity by 
which we assign a cause its place becomes for Nietzsche (and for de Man) itself a proof 
of the reign of the trope, because the discovery of the cause is exposed as a speech act 
that simply organizes an event into the institutionalized realm of familiar presentation—
in other words, we can only “know” a cause by giving it a name and assigning it a place 
temporally and spatially. In doing this, we make metaphors of the world, metonymies of 
sense impressions, and synecdoches of the self. In each case, the substitution of one thing 
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for its supposedly privileged referent is revealed as “the thing itself”—but only to the 
extent that this thing is, to paraphrase Nietzsche, ‘mere appearance.’ Accordingly, the 
binary of inside/outside (from external sense impression to inner reaction) is 
problematized at the same time as the temporality of cause/effect. 
What this means for Bordwell’s text hinges on the temporality of his “Hollywood 
system” that was gestured towards earlier. Bordwell wishes the devices of Hollywood to 
be dependent on an a priori set of clearly defined and sovereign rules. However, the 
temporal nature of knowledge as studied by de Man reveals that at the moment when 
Bordwell wishes to lay claim to an “origin” of seamless narrative, the (inevitable) result 
will be an element (the device in context) that paradoxically “gives birth” to the system 
as such. In effect, the device is that which constitutes the “trace” of system—in each 
singular manifestation we have (to paraphrase Derrida) an “origin of the origin”; or, in de 
Man’s terms, “the effect of an effect.”14 For our purposes, de Man’s deconstructive move 
towards allegory has serious implications for the idea of an automatism built into 
discursive acts, because what the unpredictable operations of Bordwell’s argument 
produce is the phantasm of a system that, through a similar reversal, gains autonomy and 
manifests, through the figural device, as working by itself. Effectively, then, we might 
provisionally say that Bordwell wishes to become the Hollywood writer par excellence—
that is, he wishes to have the last word on it. An impossible task, no doubt. However, it is 
the overwhelming sameness of Bordwell’s work—the unfailing return to the specter of 
system—that perpetuates the (im)possibility of his ambition. We might call it 
(flatteringly) a certain madness at work within his logic. 
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In deciding for Hollywood, then, Bordwell also proposes to ‘let Hollywood speak 
for itself.’ The allegorical import of this can be summed up as follows: In the very 
moment of his sovereign authorial decision, Bordwell also elides the very agency of that 
decision: Hollywood is rendered creature-like, haunting the decision as its mutated and 
mechanical double. The role of the device as an abject particular, then, will always be 
doubled in the undecidable logic of part and whole, machine and human, cause and 
effect. The spectral logic of the trope, and the logic of the device as regards “the” 
Hollywood system are, in my opinion, one and the same.      
  
ON THE (ARCH) MANUAL 
A comprehensive discussion of what I will call the Bordwellian decision is 
beyond the purview of this chapter. What I will seek to do instead is isolate what I see as 
a fundamental figure or “motif” at work in Bordwell’s corpus. This motif will hopefully 
evoke the spectral decision as such and the Bordwellian decision in particular. I am 
speaking of the figure of the director’s manual, both as historical object and as figural 
device. The manual is, in my view, what enables Bordwell to provisionally grant his 
Hollywood system a ground within objective, empirical history.  
 Bordwell invokes the manual as empirical object several times throughout his 
argument, and it fulfills two important functions for him: it justifies historical claims 
about the Hollywood system’s emphasis on certain principles of causality, cohesion, and 
simplicity; and, it serves to demonstrate that the practices of intensified continuity exist 
externally as pressure from the industry itself. The manual stands both for the range of 
choices that a director is allotted and for the potential constraints that it places on his 
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activity. We have here, then, what will become the privileged aspect of the manual as 
figure: it gives choices and provides principles, but it is also a harbinger of law; speaking 
with the voice of Hollywood, it restricts and excludes anything that falls outside the 
bounds of acceptable aesthetic practices. Both generous and imperious, the manual is a 
doubled figure. This double, moreover, has to do here with the mysterious relationship 
between subject and object; or, perhaps more appropriately, between the human (physis) 
and the machine (techne). Recourse to etymology, that favored domain of searches for 
origin, will help us here. ‘Manual’ derives, “originally,” from the Latin Manualis, 
meaning "of or belonging to the hand," which in turn derives from manus, meaning 
"hand, strength, power over, armed force, handwriting" (Online Etymology Dictionary). 
Manual, then, expresses a relationship between the activity of the hand and the act of 
inscription itself; handwriting. It is a root that captivates origin and conflates the 
privileged artisanal activity of the human (manual labor, containing connotations of a 
military operation or an act of violence, but also gesturing towards protection, as in 
having something “safe in hand,” or “taking something in hand.” The German root 
Vormund expresses this even better, meaning “Guardian”), with the spectral result of its 
“handiwork”—the “Handbook.” Following a secretive genealogy, then, the manual is at 
once the activity of the hand and its absence made visible in the aftermath of an object of 
labor. It is, in other words, “living-dead” proof of the human work itself, simultaneously 
a vessel of presence and absence.  
 This spectral quality of one of Bordwell’s privileged sites of the Hollywood 
system has several deeply important effects. However, for now, I will emphasize the 
extent to which the manual as “handbook” implicates Bordwell’s project in an oscillation 
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between the literal description of Hollywood history (an evolution of individual directors, 
industrial practices, and so forth) and a more abstract articulation of the figurative aspects 
of the “new” Hollywood aesthetic itself (devices, plot structure, actors and acting, etc.). 
The manual, then, serves as proof of the institutional status of Bordwell’s classical 
Hollywood system, and as a gesture towards the empirical realm of historically-
privileged objects.   
This movement from the grammatical articulation of Hollywood history to a 
sustained engagement with the tropes of individual films is, therefore, in all cases a 
matter of the manual, but in a form which results from the internal logic of Bordwell’s 
narrative project: for, in describing at once the history of Hollywood as a history of an 
aesthetic system, he unwittingly articulates what, from here on out, I will describe as an 
“arch-manual”: that is, a systemic horizon of  (im)possibility in which Bordwell’s 
historical narrative is automatically integrated into the discursive texts that he wishes to 
remain distinct from the metaphysical and transcendent project of objective history itself. 
The arch-manual, then, is the ventriloquizing agent of Bordwellian history articulated in 
The Way Hollywood Tells It , rendering it identical in form, structure, and import to the 
most conventional and synthetic of aesthetic structures—the classical narrative that it 
both describes and becomes. At once a history of Hollywood practices, Bordwell’s book 
also becomes a figure of history as Hollywood—that is, as an operation that loses the 
referent in the very process of the former’s inscription, as when Bordwell dramatizes the 
ambitions of young directors in post 1960 Hollywood. In this doubled context, 
Bordwell’s book is at once a “handbook” produced by the author Bordwell and a 
ventriloquized example of automatic writing: a work of particular creative and scholarly 
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significance and a generic production of a system of industrial inscription that jealously 
guards the boundaries of its suddenly autonomous nation-state.15 Both author and puppet, 
Bordwell is rendered a character in his own text. In describing this strange result of the 
arch-manual, one might have recourse to a well-known idiom: “On the one hand…and on 
the other.” This phrase, so familiar and so omnipresent across discourses, also goes 
straight to the heart of the Bordwellian problem; on the one hand, there is history, and on 
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 Brian Price provides an invaluable analysis of Bordwell’s neoformalism and its project of mastery that 
ties the latter’s emphasis on structure and system (at the expense of content) into the logic of capitalism: 
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All of the theoretical ground clearing that Frampton performs in the first part of the book is done 
expressly to give each film, as opposed to its makers and/or implied authors, a sovereign state of 
consciousness and intention…Frampton does acknowledge the creative role of directors, but only 
insofar as they become “conduits for film thinking” (75)…He does so, by his own admission, so 
that spectators are better able to feel the meanings created by a film (75). And thus Frampton is 
caught in the unusual place of trying to account for something like a normative conception of 
what every audience should be capable of understanding and a highly intentional view of the 
creative intelligence that generates those messages; an intelligence that is – to make matters 
worse – artificial. Even though he voices his opposition to the cognitive strain of film theory at 
many points in the book…and he further attempts to privilege the single film as a uniquely 
constituted work of art, art itself is strictly figured as the intentional act of a non-human mind 
(102-3). 
 
In conceptualizing an alternative to cognitivism, then, Frampton inadvertently perpetuates the very things 
that make Bordwell’s work so suspect—its privileging of a secure referent in the form of a system 
(Hollywood, the filmmind, etc.) that is represented as self-propelling, a supposition of historical 
transcendence that simultaneously privileges filmic singularity while overcoming difference, and a 
cinematic corpus that is marshaled in the service of a single arcane idea, one that the author claims to ‘let 
speak for itself.’ On the register of this essay, we might say that it appears as if Frampton is 
reading/writing his own (arch) manual.      
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the other hand there is writing history.  This is not a simple relationship between referent 
and sign; on the contrary, what the “two-handed” idiom describes is the spectral logic of 
a choice, and the unpredictable results of that epistemic inscription which blurs the binary 
poles of “reality” and discourse. The Bordwellian problem, in this way, might be most 
accurately described as the problem (again, following Derrida) of always having to write 
with two hands. What Peter Jackson’s “mishandling” of the filmic cut suggests, I think, is 
that the inscription which the latter manifests begins to signal the excess of an authorial 
presence—not, this time, merely dictated by system, but also provocatively recalcitrant to 
it, even within its comfort zone (a big-budget blockbuster). By the same token, 
Bordwell’s own presence as author is both something he would like to efface—in the 
name of system (historical, aesthetic, institutional, etc.)—and what he will most earnestly 
insist on at every turn.    
 To demonstrate the extent to which the (arch)manual haunts Bordwell’s project, 
an example from The Way Hollywood Tells It is now necessary. Bordwell’s “over-
arching” goal is to describe a history marked by the obstacles confronting the new 
directors of post-1960s Hollywood, a system that had already produced an illustrious 
global tradition dominated by the glorious names of its most revered auteurs: Orson 
Welles, Alfred Hitchcock, Billy Wilder, Howard Hawks, John Ford, and so on. These 
directors (among many others) serve as proper names that denote an awesome level of 
accomplishment and artistic success. In Bordwell’s conception, the traumatic reality 
confronting the apprentices of his new Hollywood is one marked by “belatedness”:  
Starting out, the young director naturally asks: What is there for me to do? During 
the studio era, he could tackle this problem by finding out, through routine 
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assignments, what genres he had a flair for. But in 1970 the young filmmaker 
faced a much keener sense that certain niches had already been occupied.16 
The sense of belatedness, then, stems from attempting to work within a system in which, 
apparently, there is nothing left to be accomplished. The “manual” these masters have left 
behind, then, functions as a guide by which the apprentices of Bordwell’s narrative will 
come into their own as a creative force within the Hollywood industry. Accordingly, the 
goal of these young directors is to practice fidelity to a mighty tradition while at the same 
time making it their own. It is the complete success of this progression that Bordwell 
attempts to demonstrate in numerous singular examples. Take, for instance, the “belated” 
young director Cameron Crowe’s story: “Out of the premises of classical construction, 
writer-director Cameron Crowe has fashioned an intricate plot and a rare density of 
implication and motif. He need not apologize for being belated; he hasn’t betrayed the 
legacy of Ernst Lubitsch and Billy Wilder. Jerry Maguire is a masterpiece of tight 
‘hyperclassical’ storytelling” (63, italics added).17 
 We have, then, a progression from apprenticeship (to the spectral Hollywood 
system) to mastery. The crystallization of the latter is vividly suggested by the section’s 
framing title: “The Me I Always Wanted to Be” (63).18  It is here that I believe the 
spectral presence of the arch-manual threatens the legitimacy of Bordwell’s history. Upon 
first reading the chapter heading, I mistakenly thought that it applied to the “real-life” 
director Cameron Crowe. My rationale for this was that the sentiment expressed exactly 
the dilemma of new Hollywood that Bordwell described: that is, the belatedness of a 
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young artist faced with the task of formulating a personal and professional identity. 
However, the section actually describes the film Jerry Maguire, and the header refers to 
the struggle of the film’s title character. Rather than distrusting my initial impulse, 
however, I would like to suggest that my slippage as a reader is due in no small part to 
the striking analogies one can draw between Cameron Crowe and his creation. One might 
say, for instance, that Bordwell’s articulation of the fledgling Crowe renders the latter as 
a device of history; that is, as an element in the grand narrative that Bordwell wishes to 
generate. On another register, this operation involves a sustained engagement with Jerry 
Maguire as exemplary of the best impulses of new Hollywood: at once honoring the past 
while constructing a vital personal vision upon stable ground. In doing this, Crowe will 
have become (like Jerry Maguire) “the me I always wanted to be.” The stakes of this 
struggle are vividly expressed in Bordwell’s perhaps unconscious imbuing of Classical 
Hollywood with a mysterious agency. It is something that Crowe “need not apologize” 
to. Its feelings, then, can be hurt. It is also, apparently, something that one can “betray.”  
 The supposition underlying the whole of this section is that Crowe’s construction 
of a self is at once dictated and constrained by a “legacy”: a “manual” for success drawn 
up by the likes of Billy Wilder and Ernst Lubitsch: “In the mid-1990s, Cameron Crowe 
decided to write ‘a movie with a real story, the kind that shows up on TV at night, usually 
in black and white’…He studied Ernst Lubitsch, Howard Hawks, Preston Sturges, and 
‘the incomparable Billy Wilder.’”19 It is this grand template that Crowe must 
simultaneously honor and make his own. In Bordwell’s account, his attempt is entirely 
successful: Crowe’s film is a “masterpiece” of “hyperclassical storytelling.” However, let 
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us attend to a substitutive reversal that Bordwell’s narrative engages in. Bordwell must 
repetitively ascribe the structure and aesthetic of Crowe’s film to a pre-determined 
system. During his analysis of Jerry Maguire, the reader is constantly treated to passages 
like the following: “It seems ‘pure Hollywood, recycling many clichés: the predatory 
agent, the wisecracking sister (heir to Joan Blondell and Eve Arden, the cool image of 
Tom Cruise (Ray-Bans now hiding a black eye)”20; or: “As in the studio era, people are 
characterized through facial expression and movement”21; and, finally: “Crowe 
effortlessly maps this fairly complex plot across the four-part structure traced by [Kristin] 
Thompson.”22  The intention is clear: Bordwell is adamant in his construction of Crowe’s 
film (and it director) as a “mouthpiece” of an aesthetic history. However, he is also 
described as “coming into his own” as a director, and this entails a putatively “personal” 
style: “Out of the premises of classical construction.,Cameron Crowe has fashioned an 
intricate plot and a rare density of implication and motif” (63).23 Crowe’s fidelity, then, is 
also what ensures his artistic mastery. But, in truly Nietzschean fashion, the proof of 
Crowe’s identity is also what retroactively “generates” him—as an artist, and, more 
importantly, as one of Hollywood’s artisans. Bordwell can only describe Crowe through 
the predicative object of his body of work. Temporally, then, Crowe’s labor will have 
preceded him; it will, in other words, have functioned as his (prosthetic) origin, at once 
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the trace of his labor and the only proof of his ipseity.24 The person Cameron Crowe is 
substituted by the figure “Cameron Crowe,” purveyor (and re-mark) of the Hollywood 
system. The figurative device, then, is what stands as both an element of and the origin 
for “self” and “system.” In this way, Cameron Crowe is implicated in a chain of 
metonymic signifiers that he can no longer definitively stand out from: constrained not 
only within the tomb of quotation marks, but also by “Billy Wilder,” Ernst Lubitsch,”  
and “Jerry Maguire.”25 Effectively, the authorial presence of the director is 
simultaneously consolidated and obliterated in one and the same section. Crowe is a 
director, but he is also a motif of Bordwell’s history; he is “living proof.” At the same 
time, however, this living proof will have only been available from within the scission of 
a narrative inscription. 
 The arch-manual as a figure of the double works, then, to render Bordwell’s 
history identical to the individual filmic narratives it describes. This results in two 
contradictory manifestations that work simultaneously. On the one hand, the 
problematization of Cameron Crowe implicates Bordwell’s work in the synthetic 
narrativizations that it wishes to articulate on a meta-level—wishes, because Bordwell 
must be able to look at the system from “outside” in order to have proof of the latter. We 
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have, then, an example of the contamination of history by the literary. However, 
Bordwell’s haunting labor also consolidates (imperfectly) his status as a writer of 
manuals—or, perhaps more appropriately, the writer of the manual. Indeed, I believe that 
the “over-arching” goal of David Bordwell the writer is to become a generator of the 
arch-manual. That is, the first and last word which (in panoramic fashion) surveys history 
and assigns each element its place in the system. Haunted by the great directors of 
classical Hollywood, Bordwell’s young apprentice (and the films he produces) is also 
directed by an arch-manual that he wishes to make his own. This is only possible, 
however, if the transcendent project of a meta-narrative is also possible. The present 
essay asserts that it is not, and the conclusion that I draw from this ontological fact is the 
following: There is no system. Not, at least, anymore. Bordwell wishes the system to 
be—not only alive and well—but fundamentally unchanged. What is more, this wish is 
based on the assertion that the (arche) manual, in fact, is real; is, somehow, identical to 
the art objects that it forces into existence. However, because Bordwell must admit that 
no film will ever coalesce into a perfect expression of the Hollywood style proper, what 
truly defines (or, perhaps more accurately, what renders any definition problematic) 
“Hollywood” as it manifests is its spectral placement—its fantasmatic spacing in 
proximity to an aesthetic (and capitalistic) ideal that haunts and is haunted by it.   
 That Bordwell’s description of Jerry Maguire articulates a layered process of self-
explication by its director is an interesting turn, considering the status of such an 
operation within the former’s own corpus. The question of origin will again become 
important, for I take the following passage from Making Meaning (1989) to be central to 
Bordwell’s ongoing (and sub-textual) project of mastery: It is, however, a project that 
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moves within the framework of a totalizing institutional presence. The passage follows a 
cursory description of the interpretive “skills” that a given scholar uses in order to 
“make” a text produce its meaning. The speculative presentation of these skills is 
significantly written in first-person: 
By using such skills, I can make stubborn data meaningful. I can posit that such 
data function implicitly or symptomatically, and I can show how they participate 
in unified patterns or how they operate at privileged moments. All these are 
interpretive skills which the institution has passed on to me, chiefly through 
ostension and imitation.26 
This fragment, typical of the book, represents not only a sustained description of the 
institutional framework in which “we” all work; it is also an occasion for Bordwell’s “I” 
to manifest it-self. Describing a monolithic network that precedes and dictates his 
activity, Bordwell also announces his freedom by virtue of his assimilation into the 
former. It is a gesture that foregrounds both definite constraint and infinite possibilty. 
Again, like the crisis of identity which he describes in The Way Hollywood Tells It, 
Bordwell is dealing here with the enduring problem of belatedness: “My construal of this 
or that film is a product of my problem-solving skills applied to a task largely defined by 
forces lying outside my personal history, according to norms of thought and writing 
established long before I came on the scene.”27 How to generate a self from out of the 
abyssal structure of the institution? Bordwell’s unconscious answer to this question is a 
sustained gesture of epistemic violence that has as its object an auto-biographical end. 
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 The play of the “I” that Bordwell institutes here, it must be noted, has explicit 
connotations for him. We have described a frequency of Bordwell’s writing that wishes 
to be assimilated into an institution—a process that will ensure the particular figure (the 
director, the author) its legitimacy within the benevolence of a system. However, the 
personal pronoun also signifies the bad other of this eventuality: that the “I” might be 
ventriloquized by the wrong system. In Making Meaning, this bad other is explicitly 
named and attacked: “interpretation.” This term comes to denote the tendency (at the 
moment that Bordwell was writing) of film theory to engage in what Bordwell would 
later term “grand theory”—that is, a brand of interpretation that relies on association and 
intuitive connections, always linguistic in nature, having to do with positing semantic, 
intertextual operations in the filmic text that result in contradictory meanings, exposure of 
ideological viewpoints, and the articulation of principles of unity and differentiation. For 
Bordwell, this institutional tendency is wrong-headed not because it is institutional, but 
because it has effectively limited and constrained what a given scholar can say about a 
film:  
This is not to say that for contemporary critics anything can mean anything. 
Actually, a handful of things will mean even fewer things. One lesson of this book 
is that while the particular results of any interpretive act are indefinitely 
numerous, the textual clues, the procedures that rank and organize those cues, and 
the semantic traits which are assigned to them have become quite limited. And the 
limits are, by and large, not logical but institutional…These are constraints of 
habitual practice and reigning rhetoric. To use Todorov’s term, film interpretation 
has become almost wholly “finalistic,” based upon an a priori condification of 
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what a film must ultimately mean…Many of the film’s nuances now go 
unremarked because the interpretive logic in force has virtually no way to register 
them.28 
For Bordwell, the project which calls him is one of replacement— replacement, that is, of 
“grand theory” with what he disingenuously terms “theory,” pure and simple. He falls 
short (in the present volume) of insisting on an end of “interpretation”; however, what 
becomes clear is that the authors (Bordwell does not, for the most part, bother to name 
them) Bordwell implicitly describes have betrayed cinema through their staunch fidelity 
to a system that has failed to get at it properly. They are not to be critiqued for being 
ventriloquized; only for becoming enslaved to the wrong system of scholarship. When 
Bordwell says “I,” then, he is calling forth not only himself, but also the “for instance” of 
another—a bad other, perhaps. The doubling of personal pronouns becomes an occasion 
at once to describe both what must happen and what should not happen: on the one hand, 
the inevitability of system and institution; on the other hand, the error of offering fidelity 
to the wrong kind of system. In asserting that “I can make stubborn data meaningful,” 
Bordwell is describing both a process of success and failure; both the condition of 
possibility of scholarship, and the process of delimiting said scholarship through an 
unnecessarily small reserve of scholarly moves or devices. That this “I” doubles itself in 
the ‘for instance’ of an example is all the more significant in that such an example will 
have worked to describe Bordwell and what he wishes to polemicize.   
 Let us attend once more, in this context, to the temporality of the manual, because 
it serves as a powerful contrast to the narrative of linearity that Bordwell attempts to 
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describe. The manual is an object that precedes the “I”; it is out of the past, divorced from 
an individual author and invested with the authority of an institution. However, it is also 
“at hand”—that is, the manual, we might say, is always lying about, waiting to be picked 
up by someone. That this “taking into hand” is a doubled gesture of power and 
debasement is what calls for the precarious project of an auto-biographical inscription. 
And Bordwell, despite his most urgent attempts, represents this precariousness perhaps 
better than any other film theorist. What is the status of the “I”, after all, in his discourse 
of the institution? Nothing more nor less than the particular thing that will always be 
subsumed into the framework of its history. However, this “I” is also that which asserts 
its truth—or, more appropriately, it asserts that it speaks “the” truth. And what might this 
mean, exactly? As the excerpt from Making Meaning suggests, the “I” is that which 
simultaneously affirms and denies its effacement. Preceded by an institution, it is also the 
phallic protrusion that insists on its own epistemic privilege. Bordwell, in other words, 
recovers his insignificance by implicitly asserting that he, the “I,” knows what is 
happening to him. He knows from where and in what manner he speaks, and he knows 
how and in what manner he means to say what he does. He is ventriloquized (and 
ventriloquizing) to be sure, but he can at least lay claim to knowing what pulls his strings. 
One might say, tautologically, that Bordwell claims to be aware of “meaning to make 
meaning.” At the moment that it is obliterated, the “I” “comes on the scene”; it is staged 
as the doubled locus of its own spectral (im)possibility: 
I have sought to keep the social nature of interpretation at the forefront of even so 
“individual” a process as problem-solving because the two aspects are 
inseparable…The critical institution—journalistic reviewing, essayistic writing, or 
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academic criticism—defines the grounds and bounds of interpretive activity, the 
direction of analogical thinking, the proper goals, the permissible solutions, and 
the authority that can validate the interpretations produced by ordinary criticism.29 
 The assured self-presence of ipseity, then, is victimized and exposed as a tropic 
operation—the “I” is a metaphorical placeholder for the ordinary critic, but only as a 
prelude to the reign of a system, with its determination and establishment of “proper 
goals, permissible solutions, and authority..”. Bordwell’s “I” is also tropic because it 
functions, I must reiterate, within the explicit framework of an example; a ‘for instance’ 
that permits Bordwell to demonstrate his point. How significant, then, that his example is 
his own self, rendered rhetorical through the ironic logic of authorial spacing; to write of 
oneself, to use the mark of ipseity as a deferred and routine example, partakes of the 
rhetorical undecidability between the grammatical and denotative progression of the 
example and its spectral, paralyzing self-automation—its quoted and ghostly 
(co)presence. It is an identity that is ensured, moreover, dialectically—indistinguishable 
from, but also abyssally different from its antithesis.   
 What is at stake in this operation is nothing more nor less than the Derridean 
conception of language and discourse as “dissemination”—that is, as contingent 
operations that function just as much through loss and lack as through plenitude. In the 
analysis we have thus far undertaken, this is clear in the precarious (co)presence of 
Bordwell’s Hollywood system and its devices, the promiscuous interchange of abject 
particularities and the promise of universal systemic dominance; between the fleeting 
loop of the signs and omens of the system and the fantasmatic system proper—the arch-
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manual in all its nebulous and abyssal glory. A pensive game of hide-and-go-seek, 
Bordwell’s corpus is also a demonstration of the play of language proper. And as his 
phallic and spectacular ipseity makes clear, it is a play (one might say a “staging”) that 
partakes of an undecidable suspension of inside and outside, universal and particular, self 
and other, author and text, writing and reading. Derrida elaborates in Dissemination: 
The old theatrical organization has become unjustifiable, is no longer answerable 
to anyone; the old phantoms called the author, the reader, the director, the stage 
manager, the machinist, the actor, the characters, the spectator, etc., have no 
single, unique, fixed place (stage, wings, house, etc.) assigned to themselves by 
themselves, except in the representation they make of it to themselves, of which 
an account must be given30...he who says I in the present tense, in the so-called 
positive event constituted by his discourse, would be capable of only an illusion 
of mastery. At the very moment he thinks he is directing the operations, his 
place—the opening toward the present assumed by whoever believes himself 
capable of saying I, I think, I am, I see, I feel, I say (you, for example, here and 
now)—is constantly and in spite of him being decided by a throw of dice whose 
law will subsequently be developed inexorably by chance.31 
  If the “I” is contingent, then this is because a discourse cannot be controlled by a static 
and clearly defined point of reference; a “single, unique, fixed place,” if you will. Once 
the personal pronoun has been “put into play,” the operation of the trope begins, and the 
decision is dispersed into the nether regions of an accumulating and elusive discourse. 
The inevitable discursivity of speaking, thinking, and acting as such will have meant that 
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the author, director, etc.,— in short, the subject under discussion, will have been only 
manifest as a device—of language, history, the cinema, and so on. Bordwell’s “I” 
partakes of an illusion of mastery—“I may confront the recalcitrant data problem…I can 
call on a range of empirical knowledge.”32However, eventually its continuity of purpose 
is subsumed into a play of signifiers that renders the text fundamentally literary; that is, 
at once inside of the frame of reference of and for which it writes, speaks, and echoes. 
Bordwell’s mere “description” of his place within the scholarly institution (and his 
description of new Hollywood directors) is also an operation of removal—of the trace of 
his impotent ipseity, a repetition of the “I” that is also its effacement, a denial of the 
dispersal and perpetual motion of history and of the discourse(s) that we will always be 
compelled (not) to speak. If such an operation produces a paradox of the self, then it also 
does something more fundamental: it gives it-self as a guarantor of and sacrifice for the 
institution of which it is composed and by which it is constrained. This gift is, moreover, 
not solely a gesture of faith or sycophantic love; it is, rather, the only living proof there 
will have been of the system. The scission which signals a violence done in the form of a 
protrusion, an erecting projection through the bedrock of an institutional ground, is also 
that which spectrally presents (in the only way it can) the ground which it must take for 
granted in order to exist. Bordwell’s throbbing, phallic ipseity, that abject mark of 
person-hood that repetitiously pokes itself out from the text, is also performative of the 
impossible operation of its own doubled movement; ventriloquized, one might say, by 
itself. I am driven to quote again: “I have sought to keep the social nature of even as 
“individual” a process of problem solving because... The critical institution defines the 
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grounds and bound...and the authority that can validate the interpretations produced by 
ordinary criticism”33 What status can the “I” have, then, if not a spectral one—at once 
obeying the logic of subjection and announcing a rupture in its very performance? 
 That the manual moves from empirical object to haunting horizon, and from there 
to the institutional bedrock of spectral signification gestures towards the fundamental 
status of the hand-book as a doubled object: like Derrida’s Differánce, there will have 
been no deciding upon the manual apart from its abyssal placement within an inscriptive 
series. Denoting an act of the human hand, but also partaking of the tomb-like stasis of 
technē, the manual will have become “neither a word nor a concept” in its undecidability. 
One might even venture to say, moreover, that the manual contaminates its own absolute 
presence even more thoroughly, for there will not even have been the ghostly play of an 
unsayable difference to carry it— no silent, crypt-like change in spelling—from which a 
living-dead sign might resurrect itself.34 Accordingly, the manual is always-already 
surrounded by the pillars of its spacing within the dying murmur of a (unfinished) 
sentence. The staging of ipseity, then, is simultaneously servant and assassin, the only 
proof and the visible absence of a totalizing logic of presence. Arch-manual, double, “I,” 
auto-biography...a “murderer’s row” of signifying elements whose arrangement portends 
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the greater staging of a secret cataclysm built into the very “heart” of language—and yet 
always occurring somewhere else in space and time. Even as this healing assault 
precariously ensures the spectrality of system, it also functions to create “one-self”—that 
is, the signature of what will have been always-already dead or dying. In this context, the 
oft-repeated truism that “Meanings are not found but made”35 should be amended; it 
would be more accurate to say that identities, as well, are not found but made. 
 ON THE KHORA  
From where does the auto-biographical double emerge to commit its degraded, 
magnanimous murder? Bordwell provides us with a hint through his analysis of the 
tendency of the academic institution to conceptualize artistic objects as “receptacles”—
that is, as things whose surfaces hide deeper meanings which can only be picked out by 
the educated critic. Again, we must understand this quote on the register of the double, 
describing both what Bordwell wants and what he would like to stand in opposition to. 
The following quote is from Making Meaning: 
Thus comprehension is concerned with apparent, manifest, or direct meanings, 
while interpretation is concerned with revealing hidden, nonobvious meaning...To 
speak of hidden meanings, levels of meaning, and revealing meanings evokes the 
dominant framework within which critics understand interpretation. The artwork 
or text is taken to be a container into which the artist has stuffed meanings for the 
perceiver to pull out. Alternatively, an archaeological analogy treats the text as 
having strata, with layers or deposits of meaning that must be excavated.36 
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 That such a visual metaphor provides the basis for all scholarly endeavors is judged by 
Bordwell in the same fashion as he judges everything else—it is simply something to be 
explained, and then taken for granted. But, given the vulnerability of system(s) and of 
ipseity in their supposed given-ness, it would be foolish to simply pass over such a 
privileged metaphor. For, as will hopefully be shown, the “receptacle” metaphor indicates 
something primordial about the “self-evident” project of “making meaning.” As has 
already been guessed, this indication is due in significant part to the transformation of 
system that Bordwell has described: initially an object, the manual becomes horizon, then 
ground: all and nothing. What will perhaps escape first notice, in the wake of epistemic 
crisis and metaphysical impossibility, is the transformation of surfaces. A thing among 
others, the manual-as-system has become a ground of signification and the substance 
punctured/constituted by ipseity. The ultimate and unchanging base, it is also 
paradoxically ruptured—at once by the spectral work of inscription, and from below, 
indicated in the erected memorial of the “I.” If the apprentice scholar (or director) must 
establish his name within the established template, then so too the undecidability of that 
system’s coming-into-being cannot foreclose the possibility of an even lower layer; a 
disjunction in the binary of surface and support, hidden and apparent. Indulging in a 
structural metaphor, the question becomes: does the “I” support, or does it push through, 
puncture and wound, the surface of its inscription? This has to do with the channeling of 
the double—with the “I” of the institution as well as the abjectly particular ipseity—but 
also with the double’s ambiguous counterpart: the innate. It is a term encountered most 
elusively in the fractured work of Antonin Artaud. However, for the moment permit us to 
hold that name in reserve. For now, what the innate portends for the present discussion is 
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related to the alignment of the “receptacle” metaphor with the classical Greek conception 
of the khora, a concept that I take to be nearly synonymous with Bordwell’s ‘container,’ 
in ways that Bordwell will not have been able to foresee or control—not even with the 
sovereign help of his spectral template. 
 The khora as a principle and progenitor of meaning was most famously posited by 
Plato in his foundational Timaeus, a work that continues to resonate wherever one finds 
an inscription that lays claim to a meaning above and beyond any question of its 
possibility.37 At once support, system, and bottomless container, the khora is the 
idealized approximation of divine logos that allows for the properly spiritual and poetic 
transmission of gendered, political, and philosophical identity. At once locus and 
medium, “what is called the khora”38 defies immediate self-presentation and defers its 
staging in favor of what Derrida would name negative theology: that is, a mis-en-scene of 
‘neither-nor’ in which the momentary epistemic crisis of its receding will have even more 
thoroughly assured the monolithic status of a resolution of all finitude within the 
imminent reign of universal spirit—God, for our purposes, but also that which stands out 
from and ensures God while nevertheless being a part of him.39 It is this paradoxical 
scission within the (non)identity of divine authorship that “the innate” expresses—or, 
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more appropriately, what is called the innate. It comes forth to express that scission, 
performing and testifying to it within a silent void of nameless meaning. The innate, it 
should be mentioned, is not exclusive from the khora; at once separate and supplement, it 
is an excretion and an even more primal locus.  
 This cataclysmic doubling of originary meaning has been traversed numerous 
times before. David L. Clark explicates one of the most fundamental and challenging of 
these strange interventions, in the context of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s 
Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom. In this essay, Schelling 
attempts to decisively connect the possibility of human liberty with the very birth of 
divinity; what Clark calls (after Derrida) an “origin of the origin” that must guarantee 
God’s existence while also remaining mysteriously distinct from him. Inherently 
connected to this question of a divine split of identity is the khora; the receptacle that, in 
Clark’s analysis, also doubles itself: 
As Derrida argues...the disproportion and heterogeneity of the khora instantly 
results in the production of “two concurrent languages” in the Timaeus: in the first 
instance, the khora is represented...”as being at the interior of philosophy. For 
structural reasons, the exorbitant beyond-being of the khora is easily translated 
and palliated as being-beyond, a kind of “hypermetaphysical” essence that 
reinscribes “the grammar and the logic of onto-theology.” In the second instance, 
the khora is more radically “postmetaphysical,” if by this term we mean not what 
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comes “after” the “end” of metaphysics, but the irreducible remainder or 
unavoidable fallout of metaphysical thinking, whether early or late.40 
Clark draws a radical conclusion from this two-ness of the khora: one the one hand, it 
“operates in the Freedom essay as both an Urgrund or primal ground, the familiar object 
of speculative idealism, and [on the other hand] as an Ungrund, the abyssal nonground 
that lies somewhere between idealism and deconstruction.”41 What Schelling cannot 
avoid, then, is a conceptualization of origins that contaminates the transcendent beyond 
of divine creation with what Clark calls “a necessary heritage of darkness”—an inchoate, 
chaotic mass of non-meaning that roils and encompasses the creator, rendering him 
“creature-like”; born of a soupy stuff that is burdened, like the khora, with the ephemeral 
mark of gender. Derrida states: 
It holds itself, like the subjectile, underneath, and it is thus that it merits its name 
of receptacle: hypodokhe. And we compare this receptacle to a nurse: “What 
propriety (dynamin) must we oppose (hypolepteon) that she has naturally (kata 
physin)? Before anything, someone of this gender: of every birth (pases geneseos) 
she is the receptacle and like (oion) the nurse” (Timaeus 49a). Like the nurse: only 
a comparison, a figure.42         
As Schelling and Clark both demonstrate, the khora-as-receptacle takes on even more 
weighty implications for Christian theology.  
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But what has this to do with David Bordwell, we might now ask? He mentions 
and summarizes the “receptacle” model of critical interpretation, to be sure, but does he 
mean it? Indeed, what is apposite here is the extent to which Bordwell desperately 
attempts (in order to overcome?) to decide on this receptacle once and for all. It must be 
beyond any question and for a reason no less fundamental (on a Schellingian register) 
than the very possibility of human freedom. Freedom, it should be noted, is not just the 
freedom of the will and its progress through the spirit-ensured murk of its life-force; it is 
also freedom to mean, to make and have meaning. In traditional accounts, it is what is 
given by God and ensured by philosophy. I would argue, however, that Bordwell’s 
trapped theory of film form takes us (again, paradoxically) into the decidedly secular 
terrain of this still theological question: that is, it is no longer a question of the universal, 
but of the particular: the Hollywood “system,” and nothing more. What, then, does this 
system give as well as take? Bordwell (significantly citing Bazin) begins to answer us in 
The Classical Hollywood Cinema, in his analysis of the Hollywood “receptacle”:  
Appointments, deadlines, causally dense scene construction, a balance of narrow 
and wider ranges of knowledge, passages of overtness balanced with less self-
conscious ones—these narrational techniques work together to create the 
distinctive texture of the Hollywood film...The result is a stable, powerful body of 
conventions shaping virtually every film...Those conventions have remained in 
force throughout the poststudio era, constantly and sometimes ingeniously applied 
to fresh material. Hollywood as always updated its stories by building on current 
interests and emerging social trends...Such changing subjects and themes are 
worth studying in their own right, but a complete account of Hollywood 
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storytelling needs to recognize how the dominant tradition assimilates them to its 
formal demands. Bazin was right: the “classical” art of the American cinema is 
most demonstrable in “its fertility when it comes into contact with new elements,” 
integrating them into its distinctive “style of cinematic narration.”43 
The Hollywood manual, then, functions like the khora: giving its glorious tradition, 
“assimilating” the particular “elements” that come in contact with it—growing and ever-
changing, and yet always fundamentally impregnable, unchangeable.44 Like the 
primordial “origin” of divinity, the Hollywood manual is a wellspring of “fertility,” a 
feminine pocket of meaning that both effaces and asserts itself in the epistemic violence 
of its operation.  
Bordwell, then, is a fan of the khora when it speaks through the assimilative realm 
of cinematic convention. However, he is also explicitly critical of this self-same tendency 
in his polemic against “mere” interpretation: “Like many highly routinized practices, 
interpretation has tended to be deeply traditional in its assumptions…While not all 
societies believe that a symbol is inherently meaningful, Christianity has been a strongly 
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hermeneutical religion, seeking the kerygma, that latent sense waiting to be called 
forth.”45 In seeking this inner sense, then, grand theory has effaced the potentials of 
classical cinema. However, what effaces Hollywood narrative in one instance is what 
ensures its richness and legitimacy in another. Bordwell does not wish to think beyond a 
reductive replacement/reversal of film theory, and so what he wants is also what he hates. 
On the Derridean register, his khora is both poison and antidote, thesis and antithesis—
but without a transcendent resolution that would provide a stoppage to the play of tropes. 
The manual, like the khora, speaks two languages: it is the receptacle of transcendent and 
originary meaning, and the inchoate darkness of originary chaos. For, as has been 
indicated, it waits for the “device” (its supplement) to represent it, to act as proof and as 
receiver of its meaning. The arch-manual is also an un-manual, deprived of its ground 
and punctured by the traces of its innate-ness, its plural and atemporal birth(s). “The me I 
always wanted to be,” then, is also (to cite Artaud) “the me that is still to be”; the “I” is 
servant and master, presence and absence, universal and particular. It is both what is 
given and what is most precarious. It carries its violence in the emergence of its phallic 
signification, and returns inevitably into the inchoate fertility of the institution which 
gave it birth, and to which it gives birth. In each case, a decision of quality will have been 
exposed as purely and inevitably arbitrary. 
 Brian Price momentously invokes (without directly naming) the khora in his 
essay “The Sacred and the Violent,” in which he engages and critiques what he sees as an 
“onto-theological” discourse that has come to define and typify the modes and contexts in 
which scholars, critics, students and teachers write about film form. Although Bordwell is 
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never mentioned, it is clear that his analysis speaks very much to the hegemonic 
relationship that Bordwell’s cognitivism has exercised over the discipline. Price’s most 
brilliant intervention hinges on his careful conceptualization of “the” cut—held, for the 
moment, at a remove from its localization within a narrative sequence. Necessarily 
invisible and present only as an absence, the cut is conceptualized in direct contrast to 
Derrida’s “visible in-visible”: “An example of the visible in-visible would be clothing, 
that which conceals my nudity...The cut, by contrast, covers over nothing and does not 
appear...The film cut leaves no trace...For this reason the cut is—at best—an open secret, 
or a productive aporia.”46 Productive, that is, because this inexorable absence proves 
foundational for the sovereign referent that is made to speak through the blips and blinds 
of the ephemeral inscription—in this context, what Price terms “continuity,” and 
specifically the discourses surrounding continuity editing. Speaking as he does of the 
onto-theological, this absence generated by the co-presence of blindness with the field of 
the visible is made to signify a negative relationship to the origin that generated it; Price 
speaks of “God” as that which is defined and ensured through this generative absence(s), 
but on our register we would switch this out (“God” is, after all, as interchangeable as any 
other signifier) and place the (arch) manual of classical Hollywood narrative in its place. 
And, like the onto-theological cut, the devices of Bordwell’s classical cinema are meant 
to signify and negatively define the reigning omnipresence of his narrative system; as 
with the khora, such “proofs” are only ever provisional and immanently precarious. Their 
dominance within filmic discourse is a result of harried exigency and bland repetition; a 
repetition, moreover, that has just as much to do with the human as the divine. For, as 
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Schelling attempted to demonstrate and could not end up denying, human freedom will 
have been irretrievably a matter of our relation to the absolute. Or, perhaps more 
correctly, our relation to the stories we tell about what we can never “see seeing.”47    
 In Bordwell’s account of the Hollywood system, then, we find a narrative that is 
above all an impulse towards establishing the sovereign referent of the self—the figure of 
the director; the author as manipulator of a pliant and accommodating “tool” for making 
his meaning. It is an operation, however, that must rely on the spectral evidence of texts. 
As such, it bespeaks a relationship to “origin” that is in every instant and every reading 
up for decision—a decision that inexorably circles around the empty center of a 
fantasmatic subjectivity, and one that waits for the imminent “role of a d(ev)ice”; the 
tropic movement of the device which will signify a presence through absence. 
  
THE “STORY” WITHIN STORIES 
The perpetual paradox of the self, then, could be called our “story.” This is 
fortuitous, because if there is anything that Bordwell believes always bears repeating, it is 
that Hollywood is about telling stories—“by any means necessary,” no less.48 This 
exigency, as we have seen, is in each case carried by the “devices” of its production and 
dispersal. It is time for us, then, to linger on the object of these devices—namely, the oft-
cited but seldom analyzed spectator of Bordwell’s classical narrative. The fact that 
Bordwell mentions but never (in my opinion) rigorously defines his spectator is not 
arbitrary, for if telling a story is indeed “the point” of Bordwell’s Hollywood cinema, 
then its implicit goal is categorically the unambiguous articulation (in time and space) of 
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knowledge structures that travel unpoblematically from transmitter (the filmic text) to 
receiver (the spectator). A story must be told, and for this to happen it must be 
appropriately accessible. To whom? His answer to our query is stunning if unsurprising, 
for it reveals the extent to which his Hollywood devices are burdened with a project quite 
in excess of the purported “frame” of his work: the human. This may sound strange to be 
sure, but it is nevertheless what allows Bordwell to rescue convention from the 
revilement of Structural and Post-Structural theorists.  
In “Convention, Construction, and Cinematic Vision” (1996), Bordwell discusses 
shot/reverse-shot sequences with the goal of moving beyond what he sees as the impasse 
produced by the “naturalist” position—which sees shot/reverse-shot as the closest 
approximation to real human vision—and the conventionalist position, which sees 
shot/reverse shot as culturally constructed, and therefore “arbitrary,” to accommodate the 
contention that shot/reverse-shot, while not “realistic” in the naturalist sense, is 
nevertheless indicative of necessary developments and practices that are universal across 
the spectrum of human experience. Bordwell explains: “Our understanding of images 
could hardly be unconnected to our capacities to move through a three-dimensional 
environment and to recognize conspecifics. The individual’s development of language...is 
as much a biological capacity as the inclination to grow arms rather than wings.”49 
Convention, then, is a product of what he calls “contingent universals”: “They are 
contingent because they did not, for any metaphysical reasons, have to be the way they 
are; and they are universal insofar as we can find them to be widely present in human 
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societies.”50 This by itself would seem to be a fairly uncontroversial claim. However, 
Bordwell extrapolates from this the following formulation, based on a continuum of 
perception ranging from the most universal of visual effects to the most unusual and 
culture-specific. At this point, it will perhaps go without saying that this singular quote is 
typical of Bordwell, reflecting, I believe, the essential ethos of his scholarship:  
[P]art of what we mean by understanding something “because of its context” is 
that in the representational package we are offered, the more contingently 
universal cues lead us to make sense of more esoteric cues in particular ways. 
This would obviously facilitate learning: not only do we need little exposure to 
certain effects, but in each image, the universal factors reinforce our hypotheses 
about the proper reaction we should have to the more culturally specific ones.51 
What is most striking about this passage (other than the move from an “I” to a “we”) is 
the missing definition which resonates silently within it: what, exactly, is a human being 
according to David Bordwell? He does not deign to tell us. Let us, however, formulate a 
provisional definition based on his own words: A human being is a creature that, to quote 
Making Meaning, “makes stubborn data meaningful.”52 When Bordwell refers to “norm-
based” practices, he is essentially describing a process of coercion—a process of 
exclusion, assignment, and conformity. The knowledge structure produced by this 
operation is conventional and synthetic, but reflective of “real” human practices. When 
Bordwell speaks of a “proper” reaction, then, it is implicitly understood that coercion will 
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have occurred on two levels: not only on the level of the art object in question, but also 
upon the mind (and body?) of the spectator.  
Bordwell, it must be noted, does not wish to pass judgment on the human. All he 
wishes to do is describe the way things work, as if this could ever be a neutral or 
conventionally objective thing. Indeed, Bordwell’s work is shocking for its systematic 
and unflagging dismissal of any question of the performativity of his writing; that is, that 
he seems unaware (or perhaps unwilling to admit) that his description of an aesthetic 
system is also essentially a process of human-making as well as “making meaning.” We 
are reminded, at this point, of Nietzsche’s allegorizing of human truth. Nietzsche 
articulates (you may remember) the ontology of human truth-making as a process of 
language; of grafting metaphors onto the brutish and recalcitrant sensory stimulations of 
the environment: “What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus.”53 This 
degraded copying, however, is not for Nietzsche a precursor to some vague 
transcendence towards a greater or more “correct” truth—indeed, his whole project in 
this short text is to call into question the very truth/appearance split. In Nietzsche’s view, 
metaphor is the human form of praxis par excellence, and accordingly it operates under 
an order of necessity. Unlike traditional metaphysics, however, this necessity is un-
imbued with any sort of privilege; it is, in fact, a singular marker of the human’s 
degraded and contingent status within the overwhelming chaos of the natural world. In 
other words, our only access to any kind of knowledge is always already a knowledge-
making. Effectively, then, Nietzsche renders the celebrated “origin” of the referent as 
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immediately a simulacrum of itself—the manifest doubling of a sensory stimulation in 
the form of an utterance. This is why de Man’s investigation of the trope in Nietzsche’s 
work is so radical—it emphasizes the epistemic crisis at the locus of any inscription, be it 
in the form of a speech act, writing, or even the impact of a scent upon our nostrils. 
Nietzsche and de Man turn the human into a writing machine—but one whose circuit is 
always (constitutively) broken. 
What is objectionable in Bordwell’s descriptive project, then, is not so much that 
he misses a greater truth, but that he fails to take ‘truth’ into account as a human 
category. Bordwell does the only thing he can do as a writing creature—with the 
following caveat: he wishes to evacuate the inscription of its crisis; wishes, in other 
words, for a description that puts an end to interpretation. His recourse in studying 
Hollywood devices, then, is the human physiological being as the sound referent of a 
study of cognitive “problem-solving.” But we may ask, what is really “solved” in the 
process that Bordwell describes? Would it not be more “correct” to say that “making 
meaning” is in fact a process of more thoroughly ignoring the import of the data we are 
bombarded by? When, for instance, Bordwell describes his work as “making stubborn 
data meaningful,” isn’t it just as “correct” to describe his project as one of unmistakable 
violence? Indeed, a virtual colonization of and dominance of “truth” as a category, one 
that retroactively constructs a referent and compels a hierarchy?54 
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In passing over the shattered origin(s) of his scholarship, Bordwell not only 
continues the long tradition of Western metaphysics; he also represses the political import 
of inscription. This effacement is, moreover, an ordering of meaning based on number. 
Nietzsche explains in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”: 
  Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is 
certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual 
differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea 
that...there exists in nature the “leaf”: the original model according to which all 
the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and 
painted—but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a 
correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model.55  
What haunts the concept “leaf” is the overwhelming accumulation of differences that 
must be ignored in order for the model referent to come into being. In Bordwell’s case, 
the Hollywood manual is his “leaf,” one that is likewise haunted by an irreducible 
archival difference. In their stunning critique of Bordwell, Peter Brunette and David 
Wills describe this difficulty in Bordwell et al’s The Classical Hollywood Cinema. The 
authors point out that the book’s thesis hinges on the a priori positing of a unified 
category called “the Hollywood style” that is then subject to empirical and theoretical 
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proofs. However, what troubles this project is the status of the film archive which serves 
as their case study. Brunette and Wills elaborate:  
Bordwell informs us that some 15,000 films were made between 1915 and 1960, 
and out of these 100 were chosen for close study...When the interested reader 
checks the appendix, however, he or she discovers that the random method 
employed by the authors actually yielded 841 films, of which only 100 could be 
found in various collections and archives.56 
Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Thompson provide an (inadequate) explanation for 
this dilemma: because certain films have not survived for study, “[Our] selection 
procedures represent the closest a researcher can come to random sampling when 
dealing with historical artifacts.”57 From this, Brunette and Wills make the following 
observation: ‘“The process, then, belies the claim that the sample can ever truly be 
random and thus ever be truly “typical” of that totality “film history” that remains forever 
out of reach.”’58 The authors go on to claim that this “random sampling” in fact 
constitutes an act of “epistemological violence.” On our register, we might describe this 
violence as having to do with the approximation of a metaphor; even the most basic form 
of historical research (the random sample) turns out to be a dream of logocentrism, one 
that ignores the overwhelming data which refuses perfect categorization. 
 In reference to the empirical study of films, I assert that it is equally important to 
approach film devices and conventions of editing in this manner: with strict attention to 
the plural, finite, and contingent manner of their dissemination, and with vigilance 
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towards innumerable and unpredictable loci of their “introduction.” More importantly, 
such devices must be seen as the politically-motivated things that they are. It is hardly 
neutral, for instance, that the apparent project of Hollywood devices is to express 
meaning as “clearly” and quickly as possible, and to the widest possible audience. This 
paraphrasing of Bordwell introduces numerous problematical categories, of which we 
have already said a little. But, as regards shot/reverse-shot specifically, perhaps we can 
say more. For if The Classical Hollywood Cinema represents a macrocosmic totalization 
of system, then “Convention, Construction, and Cinematic Vision” represents a 
microcosmic one based on the human body-as-system. It is a vision of the human as 
monolithic, homogenous, and uni-dimensional as anything produced under the auspices 
of Aristotelian poetics and Hegelian onto-theology; it is also what is meant to ensure the 
legitimacy of Bordwell’s conception of system. 
 That the Bordwellian system should prove so comprehensive and totalizing in its 
logic is particularly shocking in light of his complaints against so-called “grand theory.” 
Indeed, the pervasive dominance of classical narrative is nowhere more evident than in 
one of his earliest publications (a fitting “quasi-origin” of sorts): The Films of Carl 
Theodore Dreyer (1981). Here, 4 years before undertaking an explication of the Classical 
Hollywood System writ large, Bordwell effectively describes it ahead of itself: he does 
so, moreover, in aid of a discussion of a single director, Dreyer, who is effectively a 
director somewhere in between classical and radical. Before he can become the latter, 
however, he must emerge out of the context of the former. This is why the formative 
section of Bordwell’s book (titled “Dreyer’s Interest”) outlines Dreyer’s “challenge” to 
the viewer in terms of the director’s relationship to classical narrative practices—a three-
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tiered system that remains identical four years later in The Classical Hollywood Cinema 
(1985). Against the background of convention, Dreyer appears radical by virtue of his 
departures from the norm. But, we may ask, what sort of radicality does such a departure 
really describe? Bordwell’s discussion of La Passion De Jeanne D’ Arc (1928) will help 
us greatly in this respect. Bordwell describes Dreyer’s epic as performing a “rupture,”59 
as “gratuitous by the standards of classical narrative,”60 and as presenting an 
“unprecedented challenge to continuity editing.”61 This is so, in his analysis, because 
Dreyer’s film is dialectical: using classical narrative as a template and point of departure, 
it both respects convention in some instances and rigorously subverts it in others. While 
there are occurrences of such well-worn practices as eye-line matches, shot/reverse-shot, 
and thematically-motivated camera movement, there are also numerous spaces in the film 
in which these devices are ignored and even turned on their heads. For Bordwell, 
however, the radicality of such gestures is possible only within a system of arrangement. 
That is: the radical practices of Dreyer appear within a classical template, and it is only 
by way of their dialectical import that they appear radical. In other words, it is only 
within their paradoxical fidelity to a system that such transgressions are possible—or, in 
Bordwell’s language, “intelligible.” Aesthetic transgression, then, is nothing more nor 
less than where one device is placed in relation to another; a matter of structural 
economy. We are reminded of Price’s critique:  “In Bordwell’s work, art derives from 
system and order. And, as such, art never has a content; it is only a system of possible 
formal relations.”62 What this means is that, for Bordwell, the always-dominant 
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conventional system will have been the assimilative template upon which any aesthetic 
act (radical or otherwise) will have been possible. It will, in other words, have been 
intelligible in spite of its “unprecedented” transgressions. Dreyer is, then, reduced to what 
Price describes as a child re-arranging his toys.63 In each case, then, Dreyer’s “challenge” 
is domesticated and controlled.  
 Bordwell’s policing of Dreyer is even more overt in his explanation of the final 
unity which allows the spectator to “comprehend” La Passion de Jeanne D’ Arc in spite 
of its dynamic formal moves: In the first respect, the figure of Joan of Arc is described as 
“anchoring” the spectator in the narrative; and in the second, the film makes use the 
shared stories which “we” are all assumed to know. This second level of coherence 
functions through two closely connected storylines. Bordwell explains:  
In the first shot, hands turn the pages of a book. The shot is emblematic: we come 
to a familiar tale, equipped with considerable knowledge. Jeanne’s peasant 
ancestry, her religious impulses, her military fervor, and her heroic death: Dreyer 
assumes that we know all this, takes it as the “pre-text” of his film, and frees the 
narrative of an expository apparatus. We are expected to recall that Jeanne fought 
to drive the English out of France, that she trusts that her alliance with King 
Charles will be honored, that the clerical courts is in league with the occupying 
army. Since we know all this, the film may organize itself around the last phase of 
Jeanne’s life, and create that radical compression of action for which the film is so 
celebrated.64 
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This first story, then, might be described (for lack of a better word) as historical: “we,” 
the audience, share this knowledge, and we may understand what the film does not show 
us on that basis. However, Bordwell does not stop here, for there is a second story that 
“we” all share: “Significantly, all these motifs—cross, crown, messages—reinforce a 
second text upon which the film’s narrative depends: the tale of Christ’s suffering and 
death. The outcome of the film is programmed from the beginning, not only because we 
know the historical Jeanne but also because we know the story of the Passion.”65 The 
significance of what Bordwell does here cannot be overstated: he writes, into the body of 
the film, a historical and theological storyline that attempts to dull the promiscuity of the 
transgressive devices and provides a closing level of unity for the spectator. However, in 
powerfully spectral fashion, it is what is not present that must be read in order for the film 
to properly come into intelligibility. Not the devices, not their mere arrangement, but only 
what is effectively absent from the text itself—and yet somehow what “we” all share and 
read into the film, regardless. Here, in the formative stages of his ambitious career, 
Bordwell engages in a bit of “mere” interpretation—necessary, however, in this case, for 
the system to make sense. We might ask (as numerous others have done already), 
however, why these storylines are thought to be so universally shared? Indeed, even if 
they were, would that in any way “guarantee” the project of unity that Dreyer supposedly 
intended? We might ask, for instance, what other stories might be brought to bear on this 
suddenly inter-textual narrative, and what effects might those (lesser known?) stories 
might have on our ability to “read” the film? I might, for instance, indulge in a personal 
obsession of my own and ask what the presence of Antonin Artaud in Dreyer’s film 
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portends for such a reading? What if, for instance, “we” are familiar with Artaud’s 
aesthetic and philosophical experiments in theater, his life-long struggle with madness 
and the clinical institution, and his premature death from cancer? What is more, what if 
“we” are also familiar with certain of Artaud’s manifestoes—his “To Have Done With 
the Judgment of God,” for instance, which virulently attacks just the sort of cohering 
storyline(s) that Bordwell writes into the body of Dreyer’s film? I am tempted to say that 
“we” would have to place ourselves in quotation marks and decide that the spacing which 
separates “us” from Bordwell is perhaps at once too intimate and too abyssal to ever fully 
reckon with.  
 
THE GHOST(S) OF DEVICE AND DENOTATION 
As influential as Bordwell’s system has become, it has been thoroughly 
counterbalanced by deconstructive criticism in the field. Brunette’s and Wills’s critique 
looms large here, but especially important to any discussion of film form in this context is 
Alexandre Astruc’s conception of the “camera-stylo.” Tom Conley’s Film Hieroglyphs 
begins its project with an invocation of Astruc, and his point is apposite here: that what 
Astruc accomplished in his thinking was a profound historical gesture, one that 
“conflated cinema and literature.”66 In contrast to Bordwell, however, Conley does not 
dismiss such a gesture as a mistake or analogical error; rather, it opens up new fields of 
possibility with respect to the abyssal complexities of reading film. Conley’s analysis of 
The African Queen (1951) is instructive in this respect. In contrast to the straightforward-
ness of Bordwell’s device, Conley’s reading of a series of dissolves in one memorable 
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sequence has serious implications for a “straight” (I mean this in its sexually ambiguous 
sense) reading of classical cinema. Conley claims that the use of dissolves and the 
configurations of the editing during Charlie’s (Humphrey Bogart) repairs on the boat 
result in a libidinous subtextual operation that contaminates Rose’s (Katherine Hepburn) 
seemingly innocent comment: “Do you think we can do it, Charlie?”: 
It becomes a shifter, a floating figure with numerous referents in the allegory (the 
trip, the political gesture of sinking the enemy boat), as well as the ineffable 
dimension of eros written into the lap dissolve and the filming of the two bodies 
engaged in fellatio. The film transliterates a scenic drama and mythic structure of 
voyage or quest into an erotic comedy whose basic enigma asks if two aging 
subjects, with their symbolically rotting pudenda, can find love in old age...The 
film confuses the political and erotic registers in its moments of transition and 
slippage. These effects, which both screen and reveal these dimensions, seem 
obvious wherever image and writing are combined. But in The African Queen a 
different grammar emerges from the overlay of images. The film cannot denote its 
overriding conflation of decomposing sex organs and death within its characters; 
it must shunt the confusion into the gaps between sequences and in the innuendo 
of speech that floats free of images that would otherwise locate its meaning. 
Hence, the indeterminate “it” of “Can we do it?” finds a referent only in the 
camouflage of montage.67  
Conley’s analysis refuses to reduce the viewing spectator into a unified and fantasmatic 
construct; what emerges instead is a strange process of discernment and inscription in 
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between the slips and movements of supposedly conventional techniques. A radically 
particularized reading, Conley’s analysis de-familiarizes the cinematic text and 
powerfully demonstrates that there is, indeed, no (arch) manual for reading a film.68 It is 
also an analysis that forecloses the possibility of grafting a unilateral system onto the 
aesthetic object or device.  
 Conley’s reading also raises the cataclysmic possibility that those “invisible” 
devices which were meant to ensure meaning and invoke the khora may in fact be hiding 
something else—a forbidden and raging materiality that (like Schelling’s God)  is defined 
negatively even as it threatens to become irrepressibly (impossibly) visible. The poison 
that carries this leaden specter is connotation—that which the cut doubles, and which its 
surrounding discourses can never thoroughly account for. 
 We are driven to turn again to Price’s (a friend and mentor, you will forgive me 
for not mentioning it earlier) analysis of the cut, specifically his discussion of D.A. 
Miller’s Anal Rope. In Miller’s account, traditional accounts of Hitchcock’s famous 
experiment pass over the content of the film’s plot in favor of a fetishistic focus on the 
singularity of the film’s form, and in doing so incorrectly describe the very particularities 
and movements of that form. Seeing this as a significant blockage on the level of a 
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disavowal, Miller concentrates on how form is infected by content; how, in other words, 
the story of two gay(?) men becomes a pervasive connotative force across the spectrum 
of the film’s formal pattern. What is central in this secretive operation is the very nature 
of the question under discussion: are these characters, in fact, gay? Rather than assert a 
positive radical content that might be marshalled against the regressive denotations of 
pure form, Miller’s essay describes a process in which homosexuality becomes an absent 
presence (or, to use Price’s term, a “productive aporia”) that is only signified negatively; 
in the register, in other words, of the divine. This inscription of homosexual materiality is 
graphically conceptualized as (by both Miller and Price) an anus: hidden forever in 
between the flabby field of visible in-visible images, floating promiscuously from device 
to device within the suddenly open limits of a formerly closed system. Content infests 
form and renders it no longer a mere manner of the technical—or the cognitive. Here, 
most of all, is where Price’s critique is unmistakably a matter for Bordwell. Take, for 
instance, his contention in “Labor Though Theory”: “In Bordwell’s work, art derives 
from system and order. And, as such, art never has a content; it is only a system of 
possible formal relations.”69 What this means, for our discussion, is that Bordwell wishes 
his treasured devices to be fixed within the realm of the empirical and the denotative—
that is, safely removed from the vagaries of mere “interpretation” (one of Bordwell’s 
least favorite words). What Price’s analysis of the cut makes clear, however, is that this 
imperative cannot be reduced to a straightforward concern for historical posterity (there is 
no such thing as a “straightforward”  history); in fact, it speaks to a fear of the 
particularized device—particularized, that is, by the suddenly abject, material spectator 
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that Bordwell’s discourse so stringently elides. Like Conley’s age-inappropriate scene of 
oral coitus, Miller’s essay demonstrates the haunting specter of form’s double—the 
supplementary content that renders system, meaning, history, and God anything but 
“straight.” 
 Where, then, does this leave our journey through Bordwell’s corpus? Can we, 
after having dealt with the vicissitudes of his manual, depart from the screen of 
phallocentric discourses and immerse ourselves in the thing-in-itself? Hardly. I do not 
know what Miller would say on this score (I flatter myself that I know what Price would 
think!), but, for me, the result of all of this will have resulted in a seemingly deflating 
conclusion: there is no leaving Bordwell or his manual behind. However, I say 
“seemingly” because it hardly follows from this that Bordwell will have succeeded in his 
impossible project of mastery. All it will have meant, in the end, is that in watching a film 
we will never have done with the discourses attending it—laid over or creeping under the 
image sequence, Bordwell and innumerable others will have inscribed their abject bodies 
within the absences and blinds of film form—they will, in short, have made themselves 
doubles of the negatively-posited absolute; which is not so different, in the end, from the 
(non)appearance of an anus.   
 
CONCLUSION: TRUTH VALUES; OR, “THE MAN BEHIND THE DESK” 
 I find myself in the “final” section of my paper now, and yet it feels as if I have 
yet to say anything “in my own name,” so to speak. That is, I have relied, been beholden 
to, a series of “masters”—Derrida, de Man, Nietzsche, Clark, Price, Conley, Brunette, 
Wills, Bordwell (how odd to see his name among these!), and on. Bordwell would no 
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doubt say that I have demonstrated the precarious ambitions of a young apprentice, and 
he would be stunningly right in this respect. Time, then, for an impossible encounter with 
my own ipseity—my own imminent scholarship—which will be identical to what “I” 
have been driven to find within the strange space of my own spectatorship. 
 This final section refers to “truth values”—a formulation that I found in Alenka 
Zupančič’s The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (2003). Zupančič is 
crucially concerned with the import of Nietzsche’s aphoristic style, its status and its 
operation—what she carefully refers to as his “truth”—or, more radically, as “the event 
Nietzsche.” I must, for the sake of space, scandalously truncate the elegance and 
progression of her argument. What I believe it amounts to, however, is a figure of the 
double in the most fundamental respect—that is, as the (non)presence of spacing within a 
dyad that equals, not a third term, but a specter. One of her formative examples comes—
significantly—in the form of avant-garde manifestoes. What Zupančič wishes to tease out 
in such documents is their status as performative acts. That is, that in making a manifesto, 
an artist also participates in a radical act—not least because she pays fidelity to the 
exigency to efface her particularity in the face of an imminent break with tradition. In 
order to do this, however, the radical artist must encounter and “abolish” the category 
“artist” itself. Zupančič explains:  
[T]hey accomplish this not be means of irony, but by substituting the subject-
work in place of the ego. In other words, the subjectivity that so vehemently 
affirms itself in manifestoes is the art object itself...Does the declaration in which 
art is declaring itself (in the form of a manifesto) lack the Real? One would be 
hard pressed to answer in the affirmative. The point is that the declaration is part 
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of the Real it declares. This is why it cannot declare the event as if speaking from 
the outside, but, rather, takes the form of “I, the event, am speaking.”70   
Zupančič is quick to point out that this double nature of the aesthetic declaration does not 
usher in a new reality that transcends the old binaries of inside/outside and so on. Rather, 
what the spectral performativity of the manifesto announces is the irreducible presence of 
spacing itself. That is, the omnipresent trace of a (im)possible access to what Zupančič 
calls the Real. While there is a spectral coincidence of declaration and event, this 
coincidence is a manifestation of “the two,” which “is not yet multiplicity itself. It is 
perhaps best articulated in the topology of the edge as the thing whose sole substantiality 
consists in its simultaneously separating and linking two surfaces.”71 In the moment of 
access, then, there is neither completion nor even evolution, but only the reflective 
process of a contiguity (rather than continuity)—a coincidence that does not become a 
third term, but that is nevertheless “something else.”72 What this equation looks very 
much like is a hegemonic relationship between part and whole: in speaking “as itself,” 
the individual, empirical manifesto becomes the art object itself—on the Kantian register, 
we might call it “an end in itself.” However, what this means is that any ultimate decision 
will have been reserved within the spacing of such an operation. Like the Lacanian 
subject, it will have only occurred in a scission that institutes the figure of the double. 
The object is always, then, different from “itself.” Like the Bordwellian manual, there is 
the particular Hollywood offering in question; but, framing it, there is the ideal, 
impossible arch-manual itself—the transcendent object of perfect coincidence between 
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part and whole, inside and outside. It is a moment that lacks anything like clarity; in fact, 
it manifests as a blurring of conceptual vision that draws two things apart (as when one 
crosses one’s eyes) and yet also signifies their relation.  
 We will be very close here to Tom Conley’s encounters with writing in film—
how the presence of text prepares and necessitates unpredictable operations of reading 
and textual play that will have been somewhere in between intentionality and 
contingency—and specifically, a very singular type of speech act: the reflexive 
declaration. I run up against this grammatical thing first of all because it serves to express 
a relation of self to self. A reflexive pronoun, for instance, instigates a movement from 
the spurring of the action of the verb to its completion, and does so to express that both 
moments will have had the same locus: “I have written this manifesto myself.” The “I” 
begins to describe “itself,” and in doing so must perform a figure of the two. The 
reflexive pronoun is the spectral speech act par excellence, and so it could be thought of 
as the “story” of our story. Let me explain through a film. I recently re-watched The 
Proposal (Anne Fletcher, 2009). As you might know, this film is a romantic comedy that 
often invokes a “classical” feeling—that is, there is much in this text that reminds the 
educated viewer of the Hollywood screwball comedy, that bizarre latter day generic 
offering that engages with questions of gender, ideology, institution, and love. The plot 
centers on a high-powered Chief Editor of a New York City publishing company, 
Margaret Tate (Sandra Bullock). As the film opens, we find that her visa application has 
been rejected (she is Canadian), and that she will be deported from the country. In order 
to circumvent this, she coerces her assistant Andrew (Ryan Reynolds) into participating 
in a sham marriage with her. In return, he will be promoted and given the ability to 
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advocate for manuscripts that he is personally invested in. The two sides in agreement, 
they proceed to the immigrations office, where they encounter Mr. Gilbertson (Dennis 
O’Hare), an immigrations officer who will be responsible for screening and legitimating 
their relationship. It is the sequence here that I am preoccupied with. As Margaret and 
Andrew enter Gilbertson’s office, they are at first amiably (if hastily) greeted by the 
latter, who enters a moment after they do. After this relatively pleasant beginning, he 
proceeds to sit behind his desk, where he straightforwardly asks if they are attempting to 
undercut immigration policy by entering into a dishonest contract marriage. The sudden 
change in tone is signaled not only by the move behind his desk, but also by the 
introduction of Bordwell’s hallowed shot/reverse-shot, which constructs a typical back-
and-forth montage that alternates between a downward-angled medium shot of Gilbertson 
behind his desk, and Margaret and Andrew sitting uncomfortably.  
I am fascinated, first of all, by how a conventional device (conventionally-used) 
nevertheless begins to play with the idea of relation, dramatizing not only a denotational 
relationship between characters, but also a connotative play of unequal power 
relationships that begins to reckon with the always non-normative play of elements 
within a supposed system. However, what makes this sequence especially note-worthy is 
the sticker placed front-and-center in the middle of the desk (and the frame); a sticker that 
announces, to whomever it may be relevant, the following reflexive verb that, like the 
reflexive pronoun, describes a relation of contiguity between subject and object: se habla. 
Translating literally as “he/she/ speaks,” it might be completed by adding ‘Espanol,’ 
resulting in “Spanish is spoken (here?).” It is this gesturing that interests me. Ostensibly, 
the person at the desk is able to speak Spanish if necessary. However, the note also 
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comically engages in an anthropomorphic personification—the desk itself, it seems, is 
bilingual, for what matters in such an equation (as denoted by the declaration and 
determined by the structure of the sequence) is not the specific person sitting behind the 
desk, but the sticker itself. In other words, if someone else (another “Mr. Gilbertson) 
were to sit there, he or she would be (rightly or wrongly) imbued with the power to 
declare him/herself—in another language, no less (in this context, a language other than 
English). This specter of another language is appropriate within the sphere of an 
institution (the immigrations office) primarily concerned with boundaries between 
people, places, and things. What Mr. Gilbertson stands for, then, is not simply the “I” that 
speaks unproblematically as his own subject, but also the pronoun that “speaks” for the 
institution of law—in another language, if necessary. When he speaks, therefore, it is no 
exaggeration to say that he has (at least) two voices—his “own,” and the institutional 
object itself, called into spectral presence through a combination of the silent play of 
language and the bureaucratic pass-filter of a large desk, one that significantly serves to 
flatten out one half of the shot/reverse-shot. Because of this flattening affect (the right-
angled play of surfaces serving to contradict the spatial creation of “depth” through the 
presence of geometric lines), the switching of shot/reverse-shot results in a two-
dimensional game of “peek-a-boo” with the reflexive verb: disappearing when Margaret 
and Andrew are represented, and disjunctively appearing again within the institutional 
field of “Mr . Gilbertson”; an effect that echoes the alternate opening and closing of one 
eye and then the other. Disappearing and reappearing, the reflexive verb stands in 
hegemonic relation to the institution: ghosting and channeling the pull of “system” while 
also speaking as/with/for the man sitting behind the desk. What shot/reverse-shot and the 
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figure of writing offer us, then, is the double—a spacing between part and whole, inside 
and outside, presence and absence. It is this performative dimension of the device that I 
refer to as its “truth value”: in showing us “Mr. Gilbertson,” the shot also gestures 
towards that which cannot be represented, but which must be negatively manifested 
within the person of a privileged part. Just as the reflexive verb begins to experiment with 
the play of difference, the “switching” effect of the shot/reverse-shot device results in a 
here/there of the reflexive that invokes the impossible coming-into-being of the 
institution: the super-egoic non-presence that legitimates the transaction (marriage) that 
the device references. 
This initial example serves to demonstrate the manifesto-like tendencies of the 
simple Hollywood device, even when used “properly.” What I mean by this, is that in 
seeking to denote an event, the device also performs a rupture—not only as regards the 
doubled break with continuity that the cut signifies, but also as regards the play of 
identities: of “Mr. Gilbertson” and his other, that which is at once him and not him. In 
seeking to make meaning, then, the device over-extends itself. The play of writing in the 
sticker and the inscription of the cut result in a reference to an outside that is no longer 
transcendently, divinely absent, but impossibly indexed in the interstices of the cut and 
the here/there reflexivity of “se habla.” A silent and invasive reflexive pronoun haunts 
this sequence: “I, the art object, am speaking (Spanish).” It is here that I see a device 
from “the” manual becoming its antithesis: a manifesto. The system, then, manifests; but 
only within the troubled space of a cut that has suddenly become a rupture, describing a 
space of difference that must reach outside itself in order to—to what? To hold 
continuity, or to ensure the chasm of its transgression even more irrevocably? 
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The reflexive device as a figure of the double is of particular interest to me not 
only because I believe that it is intrinsic to the experience (my own, that is) of film-
viewing, but also because it allows me to trace my way back to a privileged example 
from Bordwell’s The Way Hollywood Tells It: I am speaking of Cameron Crowe’s Jerry 
Maguire. It is a film uniquely concerned, I believe, with what it might mean to speak 
from behind a desk. Indeed, the idea of being “behind” in general is something this film 
wants to concern itself with—as the title character himself says (by way of an 
introduction): “I’m the guy you don’t usually see. I’m the guy behind the scenes. I’m the 
sports agent” (Jerry Maguire). The plot centers around Jerry’s disaffection at the money-
grubbing capitalistic impulses of the institution in which he works, and it is this sense of 
alienation that spurs him to write what he terms a “mission-statement,” but which we 
might just as easily call a manifesto. The film deals in a very explicit sense, then, with the 
idea of rupture—in this case, from the vicissitudes of an institution that has gone bad. 
However, while Jerry may in once sense be a radical of sorts, he is also a purveyor of 
continuity, as is demonstrated by his frequent hearkening back to a vague moment in the 
past when the work he did was not quite so corrupt. The agent of this past is our concern, 
not the least because he is a man behind a desk: A harbinger of Jerry’s desire to move on 
from the dehumanizing affects of capitalism, he is also an almost parodic invocation of 
the old-timey career man. Even his name bespeaks a close proximity to a certain kitschy 
vision of old: “Dicky Fox.” 
Jerry very early on speaks of his mentor. He is an old sports agent that intrudes 
upon the narrative proper from time to time, providing clichéd sounding advice in a 
decidedly aphoristic form.  Fox, it must immediately be said, is not properly a character 
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in the film, if by “character” we mean someone who engages in relationships with other 
characters on the same spatio-temporal plane. Indeed, we only ever see “Dicky” in what 
might be a point-of-view shot; the suggestion throughout is that we are viewing him 
through Jerry’s perspective at some formative point in his past, but the device of 
shot/reverse-shot never intervenes to definitively prove this hypothesis to us. As such, his 
appearances are always accompanied by a question: is he inside or outside of the story we 
are watching? It is an open question, even if we accept the hypothesis that he is indeed 
only a figure in Jerry’s memory. The device of the flashback itself is, after all, something 
that is never entirely accounted for within the span of a classical narrative. In that case, he 
would be accounted for on the terms of psychological realism, certainly, but nevertheless 
he would also be somewhere “inside” (of Jerry’s consciousness) and “outside” (of the 
progression of events in the film’s causally-directed time space). As such, “Dicky” is 
always something approaching an intrusion, even if we might be happy to see him. 
The status of “Dicky” as a figure is augmented by the unflagging consistency of 
his presentation: always in a cleanly-framed medium-shot behind his desk, broadcasting 
his folksy wisdom (“the key to this business is personal relationships!”) to whomever. 
His appearance, then, registers as a form of direct-address; and, as the preceding analysis 
suggests, this address partakes of a kind of reflexive status. It does, for instance, possess a 
kind of “truth value” in the form of the art-object of the film itself. Like “Mr. 
Gilbertson,” “Dicky” is something other than a mere individual. He is also, however, not 
merely the institutional figure head that the film’s diegesis projects him as. Bordwell 
himself provides us with a clue as to what “Dicky’s” status might be: ‘“He [Cameron 
Crowe] studied...’the incomparable Billy Wilder.” The Apartment (1960) was Crowe’s 
68 
 
favorite film...He even tried to persuade Wilder to play the part of Dickie Fox (sic), 
Jerry’s Mentor.”73 This anecdote not only sets up Bordwell’s historical narrative of 
apprenticeship (or “belatedness”), it also establishes the narrative thread of The Way 
Hollywood Tells It, what he treats as a minor point: “I suspect...that these felicities are 
addressed to other filmmakers, as marks of virtuosity in the trade...with many films 
designed to appeal to a wide range of viewers, there are pressures to sprinkle in details 
that might be caught by only a few.”74 I am put in mind of Tom Conley’s thoughts about 
such extra-textual references in Cartographic Cinema. For instance, his awareness of an 
historical inaccuracy in Ridley Scott’s Gladiator (1999). A map appears in the 
background during the scene in which Marcus Aurelius (Richard Harris) grants the crown 
of Rome to Maximus (Russell Crowe). After this gesture, Aurelius asks Maximus to look 
at the map in question: “What we see...is a projection of Italy and the northern 
provinces...in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.”75 Conley takes this “flagrant 
disrespect for authenticity” as an indication that the film’s preoccupations exceed its 
classical narrative project: “The cutaway shot of Ptolemy’s Italia in Scott’s epic makes 
clear the facticity of the map and the liberties taken with historical reconstruction...while 
it also indicates...not only one of the principle sources of the film’s conception but also a 
dialogue between two different directorial stakes and styles....”76 In connection with 
Bordwell’s point about marks of expertise “in the craft,” what comes out of a film like 
Gladiator (or Jerry maguire) is not a straightforwardly classical narrative, but the 
spectacle of a discourse between “experts” that has become generalized across the 
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spectrum of filmic denotation. The doubled nature of classical narrative, then, is that it 
must always exceed itself in order to signify. In the case of Crowe’s film, the figure of 
“Dicky” must now be partially grasped as a placeholder for Billy Wilder—a hallowed 
and (perhaps) disapproving father figure whose (non)presence in the film is the very 
condition of possibility of its existing in the first place. 
 The content of these sequences (men behind desks) in relation to the operation of 
the “classical” device of narrative logic admits a figure that partakes of the play of 
spacing, and what this spacing insists on invoking for us is the aphorism. Whether in the 
form of a reflexive declaration or the spectral logic of direct address, what is made to 
speak through the art object is a form of utterance that must remain sovereign even as it 
hooks itself onto a sequence (montage) of unpredictable destination. Because of this 
paradoxical double movement, the aphorism is a form that must always be at odds with 
the temporal moment in which it finds itself; it must explode into multiple directions, 
traversing a limit that enfolds atemporality into the span of an utterance. Derrida 
undertakes a dazzling engagement with the aphorism in the text of Shakespeare’s Romeo 
and Juliet. Through a close reading of the two lover’s pensive invocations of the other’s 
name, a space is established between, on the one hand, the proper name of each that 
spells doom to the relationship (because their names refer to their families, who are blood 
enemies), and an insistence on the name as the privileged signifier by which their love is 
realized. As such, the moment of their romance is always deferred to some imminent 
moment that, rather than being within the future tense, is rather a relation of the between. 
Derrida teases this relation out within the metaphorical setting of night, in which the 
lovers recurringly speak of/at one another: 
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Everything that happens at night, for Romeo and Juliet, is decided rather in the 
penumbra, between night and day. The indecision between Romeo and the bearer 
of his name, between “Romeo,” the name of Romeo and Romeo himself...This 
drama belongs to the night because it stages what is not seen, the name; it stages 
what one calls because one cannot see or because one is not certain of seeing what 
one calls.77 
While no doubt moving far too quickly, I would like to suggest that this temporal and 
epistemological paradox is the thing par excellence of Crowe’s Jerry Maguire—and of 
Bordwell’s “intensified continuity.” What “Dicky Fox” stages is at once a coming-into-
being of the name— that figure whose name and being transcendently coalesce—and the 
name of the name: the great master “Billy Wilder” whose presence remains undecidable, 
somewhere in between the aphoristic entrance of his fantasmatic proxy and the interstices 
of narrative logic that both promise and defer a fulfillment of that impossible 
coincidence. In classically poetic fashion, we might say that Crowe must wait a little 
longer for his name. So, too, Bordwell; and so, too, all of us. 
 
Post-script 
 This thesis has been the preface to a book (about Bordwell?) I would one day like 
to write. As it is, I must momentarily resign myself to the strange, abortive, and crude 
document that it is. However, to say as much is to admit of a certain slippage in the 
progression of thought. In my own way, I have tried to pay my respects to this slippage, 
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which is beautifully summed up by Georges Bataille in his Theory of Religion. As with so 
much of his work, it is worth quoting at length: 
The foundation of one’s thought is the thought of another; thought is like a brick 
cemented into a wall. It is a simulacrum of thought if, in his looking back on 
himself, the being who thinks sees a free brick and not the price this semblance of 
freedom costs him: he doesn’t see the waste ground and the heaps of detritus to 
which a sensitive vanity consigns him with his brick.78 
This passage sums up my relationship to my own work. I say “my own,” but the very 
idea is rendered impossible by the progression of thought itself—for, as Bataille posits, 
our thought is always the thought of an-other. This small and cataclysmic fact signals a 
reckoning that one is always in the process of (not) putting into operation. That is, what 
Bataille gestures towards is the doubled gesture of remembrance and forgetting of that 
otherness that must accompany a writing. It is an oscillation, a simultaneity, or a relation 
of and between two moments of being that must be accounted for.  
 When I speak of my work as “strange, abortive, and crude,” I mean this not as 
regards the total work, nor to specific passages that might be judged as sounding more or 
less like “myself.” Rather, it is (as always) somewhere in between the dyad that this 
uncanny feeling lurks. What Batialle indicates about this “between,” however, is 
nevertheless definitive: that it will never have been a matter of clearly seeing one’s way 
towards either the framing “assemblage” or the “brick” itself; rather, it will always have 
been a matter of minding the moment(s) of forgetting and remembrance that function as 
conditions of (im)possibility for any past, present, and future of scholarship: 
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In a sense the unlimited assemblage is the impossible. It takes courage and 
stubborness not to go slack. Everything invites one to drop the substance for the 
shadow, to forsake the open and impersonal movement of thought for the isolated 
opinion. Of course the isolated opinion is also the shortest means of revealing 
what the assemblage essentially is—the impossible. But it has this deep meaning 
only if it is not conscious of the fact.79 
The status of the “isolated opinion” is momentous for me because it almost seems as if 
Bataille could have addressed this formulation directly to Bordwell (indeed, I wonder if 
Bordwell has ever read Bataille?). If there is one notion that I have tried to tease out in 
the foregoing work, it is that Bordwell reveals the “assemblage” as well as any scholar, 
and that he does so precisely because of the willful and malevolent gesture of 
forgetting—of history, politics, and meaning—that informs his work. In keeping with that 
other register of Bataille’s formulation, however, what a remembering amounts to is a 
minding of the impossibility of thought—a “powerlessness” in the face of what has come 
before, and what must follow. As such, the intervention this work will have made 
remains contingent on the spectral hand of an-other—an imminent reading that will 
decide what the next roll of the dice might resemble. Perhaps, then, what Bataille reminds 
me to do is to make that obligatory call to remember to remember; or, perhaps, to forget 
to forget.  
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